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PRECLUSION AND CRIMINAL JUDGMENT
Lee Kovarsky*
INTRODUCTION
The defining question in modern habeas corpus law involves the finality
of a state conviction: What preclusive effect does (and should) a criminal
judgment have? Res judicata1 and collateral estoppel2—the famous preclusion rules for civil judgments—accommodate basic legal interests in fairness,
certitude, and sovereignty. Legal institutions carefully calibrate the preclusive effect of civil judgments because judicial resources are scarce, because
the reliability and legitimacy of prior process can vary, and because courts
wield the authority of a repeat-playing sovereign that will find its own civil
judgments attacked in foreign litigation. In stark contrast to the legal sophistication lavished on the finality of civil judgments, however, is the rudimentary treatment of preclusion rules in criminal cases. Nowhere is such
treatment more mischievous than in modern habeas corpus law.
The preclusion rules inherited from English common law coexist rather
uncomfortably with the habeas guarantee of lawful custody. Habeas challenges may attack any type of detention,3 but the largest modern category
consists of collateral challenges to state criminal judgments (convictions).
An inmate who collaterally challenges a conviction in an Article III court
seeks an inquiry that seems inconsistent with familiar preclusion rules. When
that inmate is in custody pursuant to a state conviction, federal habeas process also presents knotty questions of inter-jurisdictional preclusion.
© 2016 Lee Kovarsky. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. For their insightful
comments, I thank John Blume, Richard Boldt, Andrew Bradt, Danielle Citron, Brandon
Garrett, Adam Gershowitz, Aziz Huq, Allison Larsen, James Pfander, Amanda Tyler, and
Jared Tyler. I am grateful to Brian Healy and Siyang Song for sterling research assistance.
All errors are mine.
1 See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1982); Note,
Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 820 n.1 (1952).
2 See 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 464 (2012).
3 See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE DETENTION AND POST-CONVICTION LITIGATION (2013) (dividing custody categories into
national security, post-conviction, immigration, and other civil detention).
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The role of finality in habeas law is rooted in the Law of Judgments,
which is the subject of two Restatements and involves the preclusive effects of
judgments rendered in civil actions.4 This Article follows from the premise
that, if the Law of Judgments reduces finality interests to doctrinal form,5
then habeas inquiry ought to take it seriously.
Contrary to a near-universal assumption, habeas preclusion no longer
resembles a Law-of-Judgments rule. Having disregarded the Law-of-Judgments emphasis on the identity of “claims” and process in the rendering
court, habeas preclusion rules instead rely on restrictive constructs developed
for direct appellate review of criminal convictions. As a result, a state criminal judgment is now more preclusive than is its civil counterpart. That finding
is inconsistent with the central premise of modern habeas restrictions: that
they conform post-conviction process to standard, “trans-substantive” preclusion law.6
Methodologically, I compare standard inter-jurisdictional preclusion law
to each of two major habeas paradigms, and then evaluate the differences.
In Part I, I explain that, historically, generalizations about lax habeas preclusion rules involve the wrong comparison. For testing the preclusive effect of
a state conviction in a subsequent federal habeas proceeding, the appropriate comparator is the law of inter-jurisdictional preclusion. For traditional
inter-jurisdictional preclusion inquiries, a court bars relitigation on issues
and judgments only if it independently determines that the rendering forum
used reliable legal process.
In Parts II and III, I compare two different habeas paradigms to the standard inter-jurisdictional preclusion model. The Relitigation paradigm,
defined in Part II, is the set of Warren-era habeas principles that derived in
part from the Law of Judgments and that developed specifically for collateral
challenges to state convictions in federal court.7 The defining feature of the
Relitigation paradigm is the rule that a federal court conducts merits review
of a constitutional claim if the state process was unreliable.8 Because the
4 See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1 Scope (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
5 I frequently refer to the “Law of Judgments,” but in every instance I mean to refer
also to the Law-of-Judgments concepts appearing in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws
and Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.
6 Professor Robert Cover coined the term “trans-substantivity” in 1975. Robert M.
Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718
(1975). A procedural rule is trans-substantive if its operation does not vary across substantive categories of law. Id. Trans-substantive procedure is generally considered normatively
desirable. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure,
93 JUDICATURE 109, 111 (2009).
7 Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1050 (2002) (emphasizing the distinction between recognition
in state-state scenarios and in state-federal scenarios).
8 Even the academic work most associated with habeas restrictions fits a Relitigation
model. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 456–57 (1963) (arguing that inmates should not be permitted to relitigate claims that received “full and fair” process in state court).
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Relitigation paradigm also permitted independent merits inquiry when state
process was sound, however, it indeed operated through an especially forgiving preclusion doctrine.
Part III traces the shift to an “Appellate paradigm,” under which habeas
inquiry mirrors the most restrictive elements of direct review in criminal
cases. Under the Appellate paradigm, state convictions are actually more
inter-jurisdictionally preclusive than judgments rendered in civil actions.
The crucial features of the Appellate paradigm are: (1) “deference,” meaning that reviewing courts will require heightened showings to declare error;9
(2) “outcome orientation,” meaning that a court reverses only when an error
affected a proceeding’s bottom line;10 and (3) “intrinsicality,” meaning that
review is limited to the record in the prior proceeding.11 Decisions of the
Burger,12 Rehnquist,13 and Roberts Courts14 nurtured the Appellate paradigm, which now dominates construction of habeas law at the lower levels of
the federal judiciary.15 It also explains novel restrictions in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).16
In Part IV, I make the normative case against the Appellate paradigm. It
does not inherit the comity and finality justifications for prior restrictive
models, and it systematically undermines the ideal that every criminal defendant should have a day in court.17 Moreover, under sway of the Appellate
paradigm, legal institutions have constructed 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)—the chief
statutory limit on federal habeas review for state inmates and one of the most
important provisions in the entire field of federal jurisdiction—in ways that
violate constitutional “anti-puppeteering” norms against using procedural
law to mimic otherwise forbidden rules of decision.18
I.

REFINING

THE

COMPARISON

Scholarship and decisional law consistently confuse the operation of preclusion doctrines, on the one hand, with the presence of jurisdiction and a
federal cause of action, on the other. Such confusion produces erroneous
assumptions about how habeas process deviates from a “normal” preclusion
9 See infra note 289.
10 See infra note 290.
11 See infra note 290.
12 See infra subsection III.B.2.
13 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000) (defining deference in “unreasonable application” in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012)).
14 See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011) (constructing § 2254(d)
as an intrinsic inquiry limited to state record); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011) (reading outcome orientation and deference into § 2254(d)(1)).
15 See infra note 221.
16 Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (1996) (codified at various
sections of 21, 28 U.S.C.).
17 See infra Sections IV.A (comity and finality justifications), IV.B (day-in-court ideal).
18 See infra Section IV.C.
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inquiry.19 The faulty assumptions, in turn, prime institutional actors to
require especially heightened justification for habeas relief. Part I specifies
the appropriate basis of comparison between habeas and traditional preclusion models. Parts II and III perform that comparison.
In order to discuss precisely a judgment’s inter-jurisdictionally preclusive
effects, I rely on a concept that I call “Regard.” The Regard for a prior judgment refers to how prior judicial process restricts subsequent inquiry in
another court. A “Regard Scenario” specifies the relationship between the
prior and subsequent courts. An appellate Regard Scenario involves the
appeal of a judgment to a higher court, and a collateral Regard Scenario
involves the relitigation of a judgment in a separate case.
In each Regard Scenario, through operation of constructs like deference
or preclusion, the prior judgment constrains subsequent inquiry. The following Figure shows the four major Regard Scenarios for federal review of criminal convictions:
FIGURE: SELECT REGARD SCENARIOS
Subsequent Forum—
U.S. Supreme Court

Subsequent Forum—
Lower Federal Court

Prior State
Criminal
Proceeding

Inter-Jurisdictional Appellate Review of State Convictions (now
28 U.S.C. § 1257)

Inter-Jurisdictional Relitigation of
State Convictions (now 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2254, 1738)

Prior Federal
Criminal
Proceeding

Intra-Jurisdictional Appellate Review of Federal Convictions (now
28 U.S.C. § 1254)

Intra-Jurisdictional Relitigation of
Federal Convictions (now 28
U.S.C. § 2255)

The concept of Regard makes the thrust of Part I easier to understand:
the idea that state criminal convictions foreclose so much habeas inquiry persists because legal institutions have internalized norms about the wrong
Regard Scenario. The canonical habeas precedent involves the degree to
which criminal convictions foreclose habeas as a form of appellate process
(southwest quadrant), but modern post-conviction litigation is instead about
inter-jurisdictional preclusion (northeast quadrant).
The dominant limits on habeas relief in early American law were limits
on appellate jurisdiction. There was no norm of habeas preclusion to speak
of because, until 1867, state prisoners did not have a habeas cause of action
19 See, e.g., Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 793, 800–01 (2015) (“There are undoubtedly some differences between writs of habeas corpus and other judgments—most notably,
that habeas proceedings traditionally ignored the claim-preclusive effect of earlier adjudications.”); Lehman v. Lycoming Cty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 512 (1982)
(“The writ of habeas corpus is a major exception to the doctrine of res judicata, as it allows
relitigation of a final state-court judgment disposing of precisely the same claims.” (emphasis added)); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 n.12 (1980) (describing habeas as the “traditional exception to res judicata” (citing Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973)));
Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Habeas, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125,
1173 (2005) (“[H]abeas proceedings have been exempted from . . . the more general
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel” (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 497)).
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in federal court, and federal courts did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to
grant relief to state prisoners.20 State convictions were not res judicata in
subsequent federal proceedings—at least not in the ordinary sense of that
term. Federal courts simply lacked a vehicle to hear the case at all.
A.

Inter-Jurisdictional Review of State Convictions

With roots in English common law, a habeas privilege guarantees a judicial forum to a prisoner contesting detention. The habeas Privilege specified
in the U.S. Constitution corresponds to the habeas power of a federal judge
to consider the contested custody and to the federal cause of action to contest it.21 Although the underlying custody may be criminal, the habeas writ is
a civil remedy.22
Lengthy discussion of the constitutional provisions whence the Privilege
springs is beyond the scope of this Article,23 but a skeletal one will help readers understand the importance of more refined Law-of-Judgments analysis.
Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution (the “Suspension Clause”) provides
that “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”24 Several academics and at least one Supreme Court Justice have suggested that, because the Suspension Clause does not contain language
expressly creating the habeas Privilege, the Constitution requires no habeas
process at all.25 That position has failed to register any durable support on
the Roberts Court,26 but judges and the academic community still struggle to
localize the source of the Privilege in specific constitutional text. In
Boumediene v. Bush,27 the Supreme Court held that the Constitution guarantees habeas process,28 although the source and content of the guarantee
remains disputed. One major area of such dispute involves the habeas remedies available to state inmates convicted of a crime.
Section 14 of the 1789 Judiciary Act established federal habeas power to
adjudicate federal custody.29 Scholarship has picked section 14 to death,30
20 See infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
21 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008).
22 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423–24 (1963).
23 I have sourced and defined that power at length elsewhere. See Lee Kovarsky, A
Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753 (2013).
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
25 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
26 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 826–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (omitting the St. Cyr theory
that the Constitution guarantees no habeas process at all).
27 553 U.S. 723.
28 See id. at 771.
29 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81.
30 See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn’t Make It So: Ex
parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners
in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 536 (2000) (arguing that the 1789 Judiciary
Act should have been interpreted to extend the writ to state prisoners); Dallin H. Oaks,
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so I make only the most pertinent observations here. First, section 14 did not
provide state prisoners with a cause of action or federal courts with power to
grant habeas relief to state prisoners.31 Second, in Ex parte Watkins32—an
opinion explored in Section I.C—the Supreme Court held that section 14
did not vest it with habeas power to conduct conventional appellate review of
federal criminal convictions.33 Congress eventually empowered federal
judges to consider state custody in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,34 and 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) now permits habeas relief if a prisoner “is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”35
The nineteenth-century Supreme Court refined its habeas power as an
appellate remedy,36 but the modern habeas power primarily facilitates collateral challenges to state convictions in lower federal courts. When a modern
federal court conducts habeas review of a criminal judgment, it is engaged in
post-conviction review. Habeas authority to consider state convictions and
sentences therefore implicates touchy inter-jurisdictional questions about
how state and federal sovereigns share power over criminal punishment.
Now, before a state inmate seeks federal post-conviction relief, (s)he must
exhaust state remedies, including any state post-conviction review.37 State
post-conviction review is, in fact, the phase where state judiciaries routinely
consider many major constitutional challenges to a criminal judgment.38
State-inmate process has dominated the habeas docket and the corresponding academic literature since the middle of the twentieth century.39
The habeas Privilege certainly makes unique inter-jurisdictional guarantees in the forms of federal judicial power and a cause of action to review
state criminal judgments, but the presence of those phenomena does not
establish an exception to ordinary preclusion doctrines. Conversely, if precedent shows that federal courts rejected habeas relief because there was no
The “Original” Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 174–75
(reading the first sentence of section 14 as vesting federal courts with authority to grant
“auxiliary” habeas writs, rather than with authority to grant habeas corpus ad subjiciendum).
I do not believe that section 14 vested federal courts with habeas power to discharge state
prisoners. See Lee Kovarsky, Prisoners and Habeas Privileges Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
67 VAND. L. REV. 609, 623 (2014).
31 § 14, 1 Stat. at 82.
32 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
33 See id. at 207.
34 See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
35 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012).
36 See Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 68–69 (2011); Oaks,
supra note 30, at 177–79.
37 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
38 See Larry W. Yackle, The Misadventures of State Postconviction Remedies, 16 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 359, 377 (1988).
39 See NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS
UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 (2007), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (compiling the most robust available set of
post-conviction data).
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jurisdiction or because there was no cause of action, the preclusion rule is
necessarily unknown—by definition, the question was not reached.
B.

Inter-Jurisdictional Preclusion Generally

Taking the relationship between habeas process and the Law of Judgments seriously requires isolating the actual habeas preclusion rule, and then
comparing it to other federal preclusion rules that express Regard for state
judgments. Domestic relitigation rules, which formally operate only in the
rendering jurisdiction,40 usually take two forms: issue preclusion (collateral
estoppel) and claim preclusion (res judicata). Generally speaking, res judicata precludes parties to the prior proceeding from relitigating a “claim,”
which in the Law-of-Judgments context means all theories of recovery actually are capable of having been litigated en route to the prior judgment.41
And, also speaking generally, collateral estoppel precludes a party to a prior
proceeding from contesting an issue that was actually litigated and decided
adversely.42 These rules, and the exceptions thereto, represent an attempt to
reconcile finality with competitor interests of the rendering forum.43
When a state inmate invokes federal habeas process to challenge a state
conviction, that proceeding is a collateral attack on a foreign (state) judgment.44 To precisely discuss the phenomenon of inter-jurisdictional preclusion, some concepts now require more formal specification. In the Law-ofJudgments literature, the rendering court or jurisdiction is the “F1” forum,
and a foreign jurisdiction is an “F2” forum.45 There is always an inter-jurisdictional preclusion question when an F2 court is asked, on collateral review,
to Regard the F1 judgment.46
There are special preclusion rules for determining the effect of an F1
judgment in F2.47 In the United States, the inter-jurisdictionally preclusive
effect of an F1 judgment in F2 is a question of F2 law, subject to certain
constitutional constraints. When F1 and F2 are sister states, Article IV, Sec40 See Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 983
n.203 (1998).
41 See supra note 1.
42 See supra note 2.
43 See Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J.
922, 929 (2006).
44 I will not address the so-called “penal exception.” The penal-law exception is the
conflicts-of-law rule that one sovereign will not enforce another’s criminal law. See The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122–23 (1825). A federal habeas court is not being
asked to enforce a judgment in the sense contemplated by the exception.
45 See KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 188 (1st ed. 2010).
46 Id.
47 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986) (arguing that,
unless there exists a statutory preclusion directive, inter-systemic preclusion is a question of
federal common law); Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 750–55
(1976) (arguing that inter-jurisdictional preclusion questions were not properly analyzed
under the framework associated with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
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tion 1, of the Constitution broadly requires that the F2 state treat the F1
judgment the way F1 would—that “Full Faith and Credit . . . be given in each
State to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State.”48 Article IV
thereby constitutionalizes the common-law rule that the scope of F2 preclusion is, in most cases, whatever the scope of preclusion in F1 would have
been.49 So, a typical inter-jurisdictional preclusion analysis involves two
steps: (1) determining the domestically preclusive scope of the F1 judgment
in F1, and (2) determining whether F2 imposes any additional constraints on
the inter-jurisdictional influence of that F1 judgment.50
When the F1-F2 configuration is state-federal rather than state-state, the
inter-jurisdictional preclusion rule is statutory. In 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the Code
provides that an F1 state “judicial proceeding[ ]” receive the “same full faith
and credit” in every F2 federal court as it would have received in F1.51
Unlike the strictures of Article IV, the § 1738 full-faith-and-credit rule is just a
statutory default requiring a federal court to apply F1 state preclusion law.52
Because it is merely a default, it can be trumped by a constitutional rule or
modified by another statute.
The most pressing (state-federal) inter-jurisdictional preclusion issues
appear in cases about whether civil rights statutes modify the § 1738 default,
and those cases cement the rule that the preclusive scope of an F1 judgment
in F2 is a question of F2 law. In Allen v. McCurry,53 the Supreme Court considered whether § 1738 was modified by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes
suits against state officials for violating the federal Constitution. The Court
found that the civil rights plaintiff could not relitigate, in an F2 federal
forum, a Fourth Amendment issue given “full and fair” consideration in an
F1 state criminal proceeding.54 The Court reasoned that nothing about
§ 1983 changed the default operation of inter-jurisdictional preclusion under
§ 1738.55 McCurry, however, hedged as to whether the full-and-fair condition
was a feature of (F1) state law or of (F2) federal inter-jurisdictional preclusion law.56
48 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
49 See Stewart E. Sterk, The Muddy Boundaries Between Res Judicata and Full Faith and
Credit, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 47, 71–73 (2001).
50 A foreign judgment is “recognized” if it is given full preclusive effect in F2. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 93 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). I avoid the term
“recognition” so as not to multiply hyper-technical terminology that alienates readers.
“Inter-jurisdictional preclusion” captures the necessary meaning. Defenses to recognition
and enforcement are housed in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. Id. §§ 103–21.
51 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
52 See infra notes 53–63 and accompanying text; see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 381 (1985) (explaining that the basic rule applies
unless there is an implied repeal).
53 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
54 Id. at 104.
55 See id. at 97–105.
56 See id. at 101.
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Subsequent cases make clear that the scope of inter-jurisdictional preclusion is a federal question. In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,57 the Court
held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196458 did not modify the § 1738
default.59 In the process, it took great pains to specify McCurry’s residual
ambiguity. It explained that the full-and-fair requirement was imposed by
federal inter-jurisdictional preclusion law,60 and not by F1 state preclusion
doctrine: “[O]ther state and federal courts are not required to accord full
faith and credit” to a judgment that does not “satisfy the applicable requirements of the Due Process Clause.”61 In cases where states fail to afford sufficient process, the Court reasoned, “[T]here could be no constitutionally
recognizable preclusion at all.”62 Kremer’s implication for habeas cases is
unmistakable. To the extent federal habeas law permits relief when state process is reliable, it indeed uses an idiosyncratic inter-jurisdictional preclusion
rule. To the extent that it disregards judgments that are not the result of
“full and fair” process, however, habeas law is quite unexceptional.63
C.

Origins of the Habeas Preclusion Rule

In the modern dispute over habeas process, those favoring taut restrictions theorize a steady state of habeas preclusion from which the Warren
Court facilitated massive deviation.64 Parsing the Regard Scenario in early
American habeas cases is the first step in understanding how that steady state
is not particularly relevant to the modern inter-jurisdictional preclusion question involving state convictions. Specifically, the steady state reflects limits on
appellate jurisdiction and the absence of a cause of action, not a preclusion
rule.
Nineteenth-century legal institutions elevated habeas Regard when the
process was used for direct appellate review of federal convictions.65 Because
there was no statutory grant of conventional appellate jurisdiction over federal criminal cases, the early American precedent contemplates whether the
Supreme Court should have used its so-called “original” habeas jurisdiction
as a substitute vehicle for direct appellate review of federal convictions. That
precedent was about an F1 appeals court reviewing a domestic (F1) judgment
from an inferior tribunal. Modern post-conviction review, by contrast, operates in a different Regard Scenario. State-inmate claims present inter-juris57 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
58 Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–16, 78 Stat. 253–66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012)).
59 See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466–78.
60 See id. at 481.
61 Id. at 482.
62 Id. at 482–83.
63 The Supremacy Clause bars habeas relief when a state court considers federal custody. See Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411–12 (1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 506, 523–24 (1858).
64 See infra note 106.
65 See infra sebsection I.C.1.
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dictional preclusion questions that arise when an F2 forum entertains a
collateral attack on an F1 judgment.
Judicial systems that distribute assets and specify rights have finality doctrines to ensure a return on the process: rules providing that litigants, third
parties, and legal institutions can rely on the outcome.66 When disputes
involve private or commercial law, the familiar preclusion rules make the
most sense; rights and assets lose value when they remain open to redundant
legal challenge. Even in the civil-judgment context, however, there is a special allowance for attacking judgments that implicate restraints on custody.67
Just last term, the Supreme Court indicated that res judicata rules operated
differently in challenges to anti-abortion laws because of their impact on
“important human values.”68
In the context of a criminal judgment, some traditional finality interests
are diminished. A conviction is closer to an ongoing decree than to a final
civil judgment.69 Moreover, the underlying asset is not property or an entitlement, but liberty. Losing defendants in civil cases have a finality interest in
merger,70 but criminal defendants experience no such return on a conviction. Finally, some might argue that the dominant function of private law is
utility maximization,71 but most would agree that such maximization is a
lesser goal of criminal process.72 Criminal judgments, however, trigger other
types of finality interests: government litigants and winning defendants need
repose,73 victims want closure,74 and courts must reallocate scarce judicial
resources.75 The most familiar criminal preclusion rule is the Constitution’s
66 See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979).
67 The Restatement authors seem to recognize the unique interests at stake when the
collateral attack implicates freedom from restraint. See, e.g., 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (“Where important human values—such as
the lawfulness of a continuing personal disability or restraint—are at stake, even a slight
change of circumstances may afford a sufficient basis for concluding that a second action
may be brought.”).
68 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2306 (2016) (quoting 1
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1982)).
69 The legal literature tends not to conceptualize criminal convictions as “ongoing
decrees” because there are mature, subjudicial institutions that seamlessly enforce a judgment’s supervisory features. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary
and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 512 (1980).
70 See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
71 See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1801 (1997) (restating the traditional law-and-economics
position for contract judgments).
72 See, e.g., Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 857 (2002) (referring to rehabilitation, incapacitation, and
deterrence as the “principal consequentialist theories of punishment”).
73 See Bator, supra note 8, at 452.
74 See Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence
and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. Rev. 547, 606 (2002).
75 See Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral
Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 140 (2012).
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Double Jeopardy Clause, which bars a jurisdiction from trying a defendant
for the same offense twice.76 Issue preclusion usually operates against a party
to a criminal case77—i.e., a state or a defendant—only if that party had a
“ ‘full and fair’ opportunity to litigate” that issue in the prior trial.78 The
development of habeas preclusion rules, however, does not reflect a nuanced
approach to the difference in finality interests attached to civil and criminal
judgments.
1.

Appellate Regard: Deference

An appeals court usually has some Regard for lower court determinations. Appellate Regard is expressed through constructs such as harmless
error doctrines, the restricted reviewability of fact-finding, and deference to
discretionary rulings. Theoretically, the Regard range runs from zero (no
deference) to infinity (unreviewable). The canonical habeas statements
about Regard for criminal convictions were expressions of appellate deference, not collateral preclusion. Early precedent developed Regard rules in
situations where Congress had withheld conventional forms of appellate
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court was using its (poorly denominated) “original” habeas power in a rather exotic Regard Scenario: to conduct the functional equivalent of direct appellate review of federal convictions.79
The appellate Regard Scenario of early American habeas power dramatically affected its content. In Ex parte Watkins,80 an extraordinarily important
case that I revisit throughout this Article, Chief Justice John Marshall interpreted the Supreme Court’s original (but really appellate) habeas power narrowly. He disclaimed the Supreme Court’s original habeas power to subject
federal criminal convictions to the functional equivalent of direct review.81
Watkins effectively eliminated the Court’s ability to use original habeas writs
to correct nonjurisdictional defects in federal convictions. In one part of the
opinion, the Court stated that the federal judgment was to be treated as conclusive in a habeas proceeding, without expressly limiting that rule to the
appellate-type process it confronted in the case before it: “The decision of
[punishment] is the exercise of jurisdiction . . . . The judgment is equally
binding in the one case and in the other; and must remain in full force
unless reversed regularly by a superior court capable of reversing it.”82 That
proposition—isolated from surrounding text situating it as a rule about using
the writ as a substitute for appellate jurisdiction—heavily influenced habeas
76
77
78
Co. v.
79
80
81
82

See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 21–22, 25 (1980) (quoting Parklane Hosiery
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)).
See Oaks, supra note 30, at 177–79.
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
See id. at 203.
Id.
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law until 1915, when the Court got deeper into the business of establishing
rules for collateral review of state convictions.83
2.

Collateral Regard: Inter-Jurisdictional Preclusion

Watkins is the rolling fog of modern post-conviction law, clouding
habeas process for state inmates. (That status is ironic, because Watkins
involved neither collateral review nor a state conviction.) Throughout the
nineteenth century, courts parroted the Watkins proposition that a conviction by a jurisdictionally competent federal court precluded federal habeas
inquiry.84 The idea that Watkins and its progeny formed a steady-state preclusion rule for inter-jurisdictional process, however, is a bridge too far. For
much of that era, federal courts did not address any inter-jurisdictional preclusion issue because the federal habeas statute both withheld jurisdiction
over state custody from federal courts and withheld a cause of action from
state prisoners. That distinction bears repeating because so many have confused the concepts so badly: from the Stone Age until 1867, Article III courts
refused habeas consideration of state convictions because Congress had provided neither for a federal cause of action nor for federal jurisdiction85—not
because any preclusion-like rule barred relief.
Law-of-Judgments nomenclature allows me to present the difference in
Regard Scenarios precisely. Watkins was a direct review case about the appellate Regard an F1 court has for an F1 judgment otherwise immune from
appellate review. Inter-jurisdictional preclusion questions about the F2
power to review F1 judgments did not materialize until 1867, when Congress
created a federal habeas cause for state inmates and empowered lower federal courts to entertain it.86
Those favoring aggressive habeas restrictions point to a series of post1867 cases as evidence that the 1867 Act simply incorporated the norms of
appellate restraint as norms of inter-jurisdictional preclusion.87 That precedent is discussed momentarily, and it established a more elastic understanding of the “jurisdictional error” necessary to void a conviction. For many,
however, the precedent does double duty as evidence of an expanding
83 See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
84 See, e.g., Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 420–21 (1885) (“[H]aving no jurisdiction of
criminal cases by writ of error or appeal, [the Court] cannot discharge on habeas corpus a
person imprisoned . . . in a criminal case, unless the sentence exceeds the jurisdiction of
that court, or there is no authority to hold him under the sentence.” (citations omitted));
Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 42 (1822) (“[T]his Court has no appellate jurisdiction confided to it in criminal cases . . . . If, then, this Court cannot directly revise a judgment of the Circuit Court in a criminal case, what reason is there to suppose, that it was
intended to vest it with the authority to do it indirectly?”).
85 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82; Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
103, 105 (1845).
86 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
87 See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. These cases, while decided after
1867, were not state-inmate cases decided “under” the 1867 Act. See infra note 95.
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habeas power and as evidence of its limits.88 It supposedly shows that,
although Watkins was no longer the North Star for habeas process involving
criminal convictions, it had fallen only a little farther south.89
Specifically, the argument against broad habeas power extracts a steady
state of habeas preclusion from the Regard expressed in Ex parte Lange,90 Ex
parte Parks,91 and Ex parte Siebold.92 The steady state, some argue, always
required the state inmate to gesture at a jurisdictional error to argue that the
convicting court entered judgment unlawfully—until due process language
crept into the other cases after the turn of the twentieth century.93 Because
of differences in the Regard Scenarios producing them, Lange, Parks, and
Siebold themselves disclose fewer limits on state-inmate relitigation than meet
the eye. First, in those cases, the Supreme Court was still using habeas as a
direct review vehicle.94 Second, those cases involved review of federal convictions, and involved no inter-jurisdictional Regard questions.95
If all that Watkins, Lange, Parks, and Siebold can tell us is the type of
defect that allowed a higher federal court to grant appellate relief by way of
habeas process to a lower federal court, then they are not exactly a font of
inter-jurisdictional preclusion norms. These cases nonetheless became the
88 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 8, at 465–74, 468 n.61 (inferring limits from cases deviating from Watkins); Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review
Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1131–32, 1162 (1995) (criticizing scholars for
failing “to take Watkins at face value”); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 575, 605 (1993) (positioning Siebold, among other cases, as a cautious expansion of
the Watkins rule to include constitutional challenges to statutes).
89 Bator specifically argues that the state-inmate cases decided under the 1867 Act
honored the limits of habeas jurisdiction as specified in cases like Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371 (1879), Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876), and Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163
(1873). See Bator, supra note 8, at 480. Those three cases are discussed infra in notes
90–96 and accompanying text.
90 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163. Lange involved the availability of habeas relief for a double
jeopardy violation, and rejected the idea that a judgment imposed by a jurisdictionally
competent court is necessarily lawful and preclusive of habeas scrutiny. See id. at 177–79.
91 93 U.S. 18. Parks was convicted of forging documents purporting to authenticate a
bankruptcy proceeding. See id. at 19. The Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that it
had no habeas power to correct “mere” error. Id. at 21.
92 100 U.S. 371. Siebold was one of several election judges convicted of election fraud
under federal law. He argued that the laws under which the district court convicted him
were beyond the Article I power of Congress to enact. Id. at 373. The question was
whether, using the habeas writ as a direct-review vehicle, the Court could review custody on
the grounds that the statute in question was unconstitutional. See id. at 374. It explained
that “the general rule is[ ] that a conviction and sentence by a court of competent jurisdiction is lawful cause of imprisonment, and no relief can be given by habeas corpus.” Id. at
375. The general rule controlled, Siebold holds, unless there is “some other matter rendering its proceedings void.” Id.
93 See Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 263 (1988).
94 See Siebold, 100 U.S. at 373–74; Parks, 93 U.S. at 18; Lange, 85 U.S. (18. Wall.) at
165–66.
95 See Siebold, 100 U.S. at 373 (convicted in the District of Maryland); Parks, 93 U.S. at
18 (Western District of Virginia); Lange, 85 U.S. at 163 (Southern District of New York).
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standard source of authority cited in many late nineteenth-century Supreme
Court cases recognizing what the Court viewed as a longstanding rule: that
jurisdictionally competent state convictions precluded collateral relief in federal district court.96 That line of precedent was ultimately rejected by the
cases discussed in Sections II.A and II.B, but it contributes meaningfully to
the broader narrative about the natural state of preclusion rules in federal
habeas cases.
***
Standard inter-jurisdictional preclusion law dictates that an F1 judgment
is void in F2 if it was not the result of full-and-fair process.97 As Parts II and
III demonstrate, the procedural integrity of the state (F1) criminal proceeding is a less and less salient condition of habeas preclusion in federal (F2)
court. In many other respects, too, the habeas finality doctrines have now
become far more preclusive than those of the standard model.
II.

THE RELITIGATION PARADIGM

In Part II, I dissect the era during which legal institutions treated state
convictions as less preclusive than civil judgments. The era’s dominant
habeas model, what I call the “Relitigation paradigm,” nonetheless retained
certain basic features of an inter-jurisdictional preclusion inquiry. The Relitigation paradigm flourished under the Warren Court, but its influence has
diminished since. Under the Relitigation paradigm, habeas proceedings
expressed Regard in the familiar two-step form applied to collateral litigation, with the first step focused on the reliability of F1 process. The basic
normative justification for the Relitigation model centered on things like the
importance of the underlying constitutional challenges, the superior institutional competence of federal court as a forum for resolving those issues, and
the primacy of a liberty interest in any adjudication touching on custody.98
96 See, e.g., Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 276 (1895) (citing Siebold, 100 U.S. at 375);
In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 75 (1893) (first citing Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163; then
citing Siebold, 100 U.S. 371); Ex parte Bridges, 4 F. Cas. 98, 105 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No.
1862) (authored by Justice Bradley riding circuit and citing Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163);
cf. Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655, 659 (1895) (“The court below having had jurisdiction of the offence and of the accused, and having proceeded under a statute not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, the Circuit Court of the United States had no
authority to interfere, by means of a writ of habeas corpus, with the execution of the sentence.” (first citing Andrews, 156 U.S. 272; and then citing New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89, 98
(1894)); In re Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291, 297 (1891) (“The errors, if any, committed by that
court in respect to any of those matters, did not affect its jurisdiction of the offence or of
the person accused, and cannot be reached by habeas corpus.”).
97 See supra notes 53–63 and accompanying text.
98 See Woolhandler, supra note 88, at 578–79 (collecting authority). Many also believe
that the paradigm insufficiently reflected the comity and federalism interests implicated by
an F2 proceeding in which a foreign law (the state conviction) might be declared invalid.
See also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279 (2008); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Con-
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The Relitigation paradigm has four elemental features. First, it operates
through two discrete steps: a process-oriented decision about whether or to
what degree a state conviction precluded federal habeas consideration, followed by a decision “on the merits” of the claim. Second, the universe of
evidence capable of being considered during both the Step 1 preclusion and
Step 2 merits inquiries was fairly robust, and not limited to the state record.
Third, for legal and factual issues that the state court actually decided on the
merits, the relitigation conditions could always be satisfied at least by showing
defects in the state process. Fourth, the operative legal constructs were closer
to issue-preclusion than to claim-preclusion rules.
The observation that the Warren Court expanded the opportunity for
inmates to relitigate criminal judgments is nothing new. The neglected idea
involves the form that the increased litigation opportunity took. By distinguishing the actual preclusion law from a jurisdictional provision authorizing
federal courts to award relief and a cause of action necessary to seek it, I am
in a superior position to do an apples-to-apples comparison of the Relitigation paradigm and a more conventional inter-jurisdictional preclusion
model. Moreover, isolating the preclusion law reveals just how substantially
the Appellate paradigm, discussed in Part III, deviates from more general
preclusive norms.
A.

Pre-Brown v. Allen

The 1867 Habeas Corpus Act extended federal habeas power to reach
“all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation
of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.”99 “Modern”
post-conviction law begins with Brown v. Allen,100 decided in 1953. Brown
affirmed—or established, depending on one’s point of view—that the 1867
Act permitted state inmates to relitigate challenges to their convictions in
federal court.101 The conditions for such relitigation are the phenomena at
issue when federal habeas law is criticized as giving insufficiently preclusive
effect to state convictions. Brown and the 1867 Act anchor most historical
debates about the preclusive effect of state convictions.102
servative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 465
(2002).
99 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
100 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
101 The denomination of the opinions is confusing, but the decision on the pertinent
issue in Brown was announced in an opinion by Justice Felix Frankfurter in a companion
case. See Daniels v. Allen, reported sub nom. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 488–513 (1953)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
102 Compare Bator, supra note 8, at 463–64 (depicting mid-twentieth-century Supreme
Court law permitting extensive habeas relitigation by state inmates as an expansion from
previous understandings of the writ), with Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus
Relitigation, 16 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 579, 660–63 (1982) (arguing that
Professor Bator’s theory of the federal privilege for state inmates is too restrictive). Professors Bator and Peller are the two figures most readily associated with the two major sides in
the debate. See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas
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The legitimacy of the Relitigation paradigm centers substantially on
interpretation of precedent announced between the 1867 Act and Brown,103
and on when federal judges obtained legitimate authority to look behind the
face of a state conviction and conduct more searching federal habeas process. The pertinent decisions exclude a proposition favored by those critical
of the Relitigation paradigm: that a state conviction, issued by a jurisdictionally competent court, barred collateral habeas scrutiny.104 I am not the first
person to make that point,105 and my emphasis is elsewhere—on the comparison between the pre-Brown state-inmate cases and the features of standard
inter-jurisdictional preclusion inquiry. In criticizing Relitigation paradigm
features, opinions and scholarship abound with references to a collection of
older decisions in which federal habeas relief was unavailable for F1 state
criminal process marred by error other than a defect in subject-matter or
personal jurisdiction.106 That account, among other things,107 ultimately
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2041–48 (1992) (contrasting “The
Bator Thesis” with the “The Brennan-Peller Thesis” (emphasis omitted)).
103 See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (granting habeas relief for conviction obtained after the Elaine Race Riot, noting unavailability of sufficient state corrective
process); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (denying habeas relief in the murder trial
of Leo Frank, citing availability of state corrective process); see also supra notes 87–89 (collecting other authority).
104 I strongly disagree with Professor Bator’s categorical description of the state of
habeas law during even the earliest parts of this period. Professor Bator wrote: “[In 1915,]
if a court of competent jurisdiction adjudicated a federal question in a criminal case, its
decision of that question was final . . . and not subject to redetermination on habeas
corpus.” Bator, supra note 8, at 483. He dismissed cases inconsistent with that general
principle as part of “a few classes of issues . . . which were labeled jurisdictional though they
did not really bear on the competence of the committing court; these were, however,
strictly limited and their creation was probably grounded on the lack of appeal in federal
criminal cases.” Id. at 483–84. Professor Bator is, of course, referring to the cases decided
in the appellate Regard Scenario, which do not translate well for inter-jurisdictional-preclusion inquiries. Some cases certainly support the general principle Professor Bator identifies, but the picture is far more muddled than he suggests. The case most explicitly stating
the general principle is an equal protection case about a juror-selection claim that the
inmate forfeited at trial, and does not exclude the possibility that any conviction obtained
in violation of due process was void. See In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 285 (1891) (cited as
leading by Bator, supra note 8, at 481). Nor do the other cases upon which Professor Bator
relies deal with due process violations. See, e.g., Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 276
(1895) (cited by Bator, supra note 8, at 482); In re Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291, 296–97 (1891)
(same). In cases where the Supreme Court did encounter a state inmate alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, it generally treated the due process allegation as a claim of jurisdictional error and reached the merits. See infra note 107.
105 See, e.g., Peller, supra note 102, at 603–63 (revisiting decisional history preceding
Brown).
106 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 454 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“There can
be no doubt of the limited scope of habeas corpus during this formative period, and of the
consistent efforts to confine the writ to questions of jurisdiction.”); Forsythe, supra note 88,
at 1162 (criticizing scholars for failing “to take Watkins at face value”); Kent S. Scheidegger,
Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 932 (1998)
(criticizing abandonment of Watkins in collateral Regard Scenarios).
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traces to precedent that never actually spoke to an inter-jurisdictional preclusion issue. The pertinent decisions—Ex parte Watkins,108 Ex parte Lange,109
Ex parte Parks,110 and Ex parte Siebold111—are not inter-jurisdictional preclusion cases, and are subject to different preclusion norms because they
involved federal judgments.112
There was simply no pertinent inter-jurisdictional habeas precedent
before 1867.113 Until 1867—subject to exceptions not relevant here114—federal habeas relief for state inmates was categorically unavailable, whether
there was a state conviction or not.115 There was neither federal jurisdiction
for courts to entertain, nor a federal cause of action for state inmates to
assert, constitutional claims. Once the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act116 made
inter-jurisdictional preclusion a live issue by establishing both jurisdiction
and a cause of action,117 the availability of federal relitigation became quite
107 Another issue with the account is that there is a competing explanation for why
habeas relief was infrequently granted to state prisoners: because it was limited to due
process violations, and there were few due process restrictions on the states. See Peller,
supra note 102, at 621–22. The due process constraints on states that did exist—requirements that courts have subject-matter and personal jurisdiction—were precisely the types
of error that voided convictions. See, e.g., Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 24 (1939) (“But
if it be found that the court had no jurisdiction to try the petitioner . . . the remedy of
habeas corpus is available.” (citations omitted)). The cases cited by Professor Bator do not
exclude this possibility, because none foreclosed relief for a Fourteenth Amendment due
process violation. See supra sources collected in note 104. The Supreme Court quite
explicitly reached the merits of Fourteenth Amendment due process claims other than allegations of defects in subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Felts v. Murphy, 201
U.S. 123, 129 (1906) (“The appellant was not deprived of his liberty without due process of
law by the manner in which he was tried, so as to violate the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.”); In re Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 631 (1891) (“The
single question is whether appellant is held in custody in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States . . . .”).
108 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
109 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
110 93 U.S. 18 (1876).
111 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
112 See id. at 372; Parks, 93 U.S. at 18; Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 165–66; Watkins, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) at 194.
113 In Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1858), the Supreme Court barred
state habeas consideration of a federal conviction. That decision was based on the
Supremacy Clause, not preclusion. Id. at 517–18.
114 South Carolina moved to nullify federal tax law, and Congress passed the Force Act
of 1833 to ensure habeas relief for federal officials arrested for enforcing it. See Habeas
Corpus Act of 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634. In response to a diplomatic crisis, Congress passed the Force Act of 1842, which provided habeas relief for foreign representatives
detained for conduct undertaken in their official capacities. See Habeas Corpus Act of
1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539.
115 See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 105 (1845).
116 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
117 There was no cause of action available to state detainees under the Judiciary Act of
1789, which permitted habeas consideration only of custody “under or by colour of the
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sensitive to the reliability of the F1 state procedure.118 Under Law-of-Judgments principles, there is no reason why the holding from Watkins—that the
Supreme Court could not use its original habeas power to correct nonjurisdictional error in federal convictions119—would require the same level of
Regard to be expressed in a rule that operated collaterally and interjurisdictionally.
In the two canonical pre-Brown state-inmate cases, Frank v. Mangum120
and Moore v. Dempsey,121 the Supreme Court began to “soften” the appellate
and intra-jurisdictional habeas Regard that emerged from Lange, Parks, and
Siebold. An entirely different set of institutional imperatives—including the
push to collateralize litigation involving the judgment of another sovereign—
gave rise to Frank and Moore, which seeded the Relitigation paradigm for
collateral state-inmate cases. Professor Bator positioned Frank and Moore as
the seminal precedent for his “full and fair” model of habeas law,122 but what
he identified was simply an emphasis on full-and-fair F1 process typical of
inter-jurisdictional preclusion inquiry.
In Frank, a Georgia inmate claimed that a southern mob dominated his
murder trial—a national media sensation—and that he was convicted without due process.123 The Supreme Court went as far as to “put out of view . . .
the suggestion that even the questions of fact bearing upon the jurisdiction
of the trial court could be conclusively determined against the prisoner by
the decision of the state court of last resort.”124 The Court, however, determined that Frank’s conviction was lawful on the merits, and that the availability of state corrective process was sufficient to avoid any due process
problem.125 To put the result a little differently, the Supreme Court denied
relief because it determined, as a substantive matter, that the conviction was
lawful; and it only determined the conviction was substantively lawful because
it was pursuant to due process. Frank did not bar relitigation in spite of a due
process violation.
Justice Holmes dissented in Frank, but secured his majority in Moore, a
case stemming from the Elaine Race Riots in Arkansas.126 Moore was capitally sentenced for his alleged role in the riots.127 The defense lawyer did not
meet with Moore until trial, he called no witnesses and presented no evidence, the trial took less than an hour, and the jury deliberated for less than
authority of the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82; Dorr, 44
U.S. (3 How.) at 105.
118 But see supra note 96 (collecting late nineteenth-century cases parroting the Watkins
rule for inter-jurisdictional preclusion scenarios).
119 See 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830).
120 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
121 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
122 See Bator, supra note 8, at 486–89.
123 See 237 U.S. at 324–25.
124 Id. at 334.
125 See id. at 334–36.
126 261 U.S. 86.
127 See id. at 89.
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five minutes.128 The Supreme Court made federal habeas relief available,
but an important distinction as to the reason is not immediately clear from
the face of the opinion. One might fairly read Moore as of a piece with Frank:
a substantive determination that the custody was lawful because corrective
appellate process was sufficient. One might also read Moore a bit differently,
to say that state corrective process disables the habeas remedy notwithstanding unlawful custody. The difference between the two readings lies in the
conceptual significance of appellate process. On the first reading, such process ensures the lawfulness of custody; on the second, it has no effect on
lawfulness but still bars relief.
In the period between Moore and Brown, the Court issued several stateinmate opinions that generally (if a bit clumsily) described the absence of
state corrective process as a condition for federal habeas relief rather than
necessary for a due process violation.129 Conceptualizing defective state corrective process as a remedial condition was crucial to Professor Bator’s fulland-fair proposal,130 but the distinction between right and remedy does not
bear meaningfully on my position. Under either conceptualization, defective
state process permitted federal habeas relitigation. Moreover, the emphasis
on prior process as expressed through Frank and Moore arose at precisely the
time that habeas relief became an inter-jurisdictional preclusion question.
That question had remained unsettled until the turn of the twentieth century
because there was no antebellum federal remedy for state inmates and
128 See id.
129 See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945) (per curiam) (“[T]he allegations . . . make out prima facie cases of violation of these constitutional rights of petitioners, sufficient to invoke corrective process in some court, and in the federal district court if
none is afforded by the state.”); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48 (1945) (“[W]here a state
court has considered and adjudicated the merits of a petitioner’s contentions . . . a federal
court will not ordinarily reexamine upon writ of habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated. But that rule is inapplicable where . . . the basis of the state court decision is that the
particular remedy sought is not one allowed by state law . . . .” (citations omitted)); Ex parte
Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944) (per curiam) (“But where resort to state court remedies
has failed to afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised . . . a
federal court should entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be remediless.”
(citations omitted)); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1942) (per curiam) (“[T]he
use of the writ . . . extends . . . to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in
disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective
means of preserving his rights.” (citations omitted)); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467
(1938) (“If [the contention that he had no effective appellate remedy is] true in fact, it
necessarily follows that no legal procedural remedy is available to grant relief for a violation of constitutional rights, unless the courts protect petitioner’s rights by habeas corpus.
Of the contention that the law provides no effective remedy for such a deprivation of rights
affecting life and liberty, it may well be said that it ‘falls with the premise.’ To deprive a
citizen of his only effective remedy would not only be contrary to the ‘rudimentary
demands of justice’ but destructive of a constitutional guaranty specifically designed to
prevent injustice.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1935))).
130 Professor Bator was developing a narrative in which only certain types of due process violations triggered federal habeas relief. See Bator, supra note 8, at 481.
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because many of the due process guarantees that define a “full and fair” proceeding had not been applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.131
Frank and Moore are not points further to one end of an appellateRegard continuum that also includes Parks, Lange, and Siebold; they sit on an
entirely separate axis. Frank and Moore speak to the early preclusion norms
from inter-jurisdictional habeas cases; cases decided under the other Regard
Scenario do not. I do not mean to imply that Frank and Moore were consistent with all of the inter-jurisdictional habeas precedent decided in the
1890s.132 They are, however, recognized as landmark cases precisely
because, rather than parrot language from the appellate Regard cases, they
began to wrestle with the collateral features of the habeas posture.
B.

Relitigation Paradigm Features

Brown v. Allen resides on the Moore-Frank axis, and was the decisive
moment in the fight over the meaning of the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act. In
Brown, the Supreme Court held that state inmates could collaterally relitigate
their convictions in federal court, without respect to whether prior state consideration of the claim was procedurally defective.133 That federal relitigation could proceed notwithstanding a procedurally sound state disposition on the claim was
what distinguished habeas as an “exception to res judicata.”134 If habeas relief
were contingent on a failure of full-and-fair state process, then there would
be nothing distinguishing the inter-jurisdictionally preclusive effect of a state
conviction from that of an ordinary civil judgment.
As opposed to Frank and Moore, Brown devotes considerable space to
explaining the unique dimensions of inter-jurisdictional preclusion in federal habeas cases. The opinions in Brown, for example, explore how the
inter-jurisdictional relitigation constraints should reflect interests in comity
and federalism, in addition to finality.135 As the font of the Relitigation paradigm, Brown announced the rule for federal consideration of claims actually
litigated in state proceedings; but it also prefigures rules for forfeited claims
and for predicate fact determinations. Through Brown (claims decided on
the merits), Fay v. Noia (forfeited claims),136 Townsend v. Sain (factual predicates),137 and the 1966 Habeas Amendments,138 American legal institutions
ratified the Relitigation paradigm, customized to the unique inter-jurisdic131 See supra note 107.
132 See supra note 96.
133 See 344 U.S. 443, 500–01 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
134 See supra note 19.
135 See 344 U.S. at 497–501; id. at 533–40, 543–45 (Jackson, J., concurring in result); id.
at 553–54 (Black, J., dissenting).
136 372 U.S. 391, 398–99 (1963), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722
(1991).
137 372 U.S. 293, 319–22 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1
(1992).
138 Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat. 1104, 1105–06.
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tional preclusion issues presented by collateral challenges to state
convictions.
Four attributes emerged across different types of Relitigation paradigm
inquiries. First (and most importantly), the decision to grant habeas relief
always consisted of two steps. A court had to make an initial determination as
to the preclusive scope of the state judgment, and then had to decide “the
merits” in light of any applicable relitigation restriction. In cases where state
inmates were able to avoid any restriction—where there was no preclusion
whatsoever—a federal court decided the claim simpliciter. Even in cases
where inmates could not avoid relitigation restrictions, however, those
restrictions did not take the form of categorical preclusion bars. If the conviction had preclusive effect, it usually took the form of an evidentiary presumption at the second-step merits determination.139
Second, the Relitigation paradigm had a distinct process orientation.
For legal and factual issues that the state court actually decided on the merits, the relitigation conditions could make a Step 1 showing that there was no
preclusion at least by showing defects in the state process for deciding the
constitutional challenge.140 In fact, federal courts could generally exercise
independent judgment about even claims that states decided pursuant to
perfectly reliable process, and that authority was a source of major disagreement within legal institutions and the academy.141 That defective or otherwise unreliable process was sufficient to avoid the (Step 1) relitigation
restriction, however, was never in doubt. Even the leading critic of independent judicial evaluation, Professor Bator, never questioned the appropriateness of such inquiry when the state procedure or legal reasoning could not
produce confidence in a conclusion.142
Third, the universe of evidence capable of being considered during both
the (Step 1) preclusion and (Step 2) merits inquiries was fairly robust, and
not limited to the state record.143 (The admissibility of evidence outside the
F1 record is a typical feature of an inter-jurisdictional preclusion inquiry.)144
Federal courts were not only permitted to conduct evidentiary hearings for the
preclusion and merits inquiries, they were frequently required to hold
them.145 Any presumption of correctness attached after the Step 1 inquiry
resulted in a conclusion that the state process was reliable, not during Step 1,
the process by which reliability was shown.146
139 See infra subsection II.B.3.
140 See, e.g., infra subsections II.B.1 (claims decided on the merits), II.B.3 (factfindings).
141 See, e.g., supra note 102 (describing axis of academic disagreement).
142 See Bator, supra note 8, at 489.
143 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 (1938).
144 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 77 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
145 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 111 (1985).
146 See Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat. 1104, 1105 (repealed).
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Fourth, the restrictions on federal consideration were more in the
nature of issue preclusion than claim preclusion.147 State courts might have
decided some challenges to a conviction on the merits, and inmates may
have procedurally forfeited others. These four features of the Relitigation
paradigm were expressed across different types of federal habeas inquiry,
with the most important expressions appearing in law controlling federal litigation of claims decided on the merits, forfeited claims, and fact questions.
Part III uses these same categories of habeas inquiry to demonstrate the influence of the modern Appellate paradigm.
1.

Claims Decided on the Merits

Brown held that the 1867 Act authorized federal courts to make independent determinations on the merits of claims, without much respect for the
adequacy and outcome of—i.e., without much Regard for—prior state process.148 Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter explained that “[i]t is
inadmissible to deny the use of the writ merely because a State court has
passed on a federal constitutional issue.”149 That the state record adequately
supported a state disposition was never sufficient to preclude federal consideration. Winding down the lengthy opinion, Justice Frankfurter emphasized
that the Regard Scenario was inter-jurisdictional relitigation, and not appellate review: “[I]t is not a case of a lower [federal] court sitting in judgment
on a higher [state supreme] court.”150
To understand how the Relitigation model dealt with claims that state
courts decided on the merits, recall that relitigation occurs in two steps.
First, a court decides, as a procedural matter, whether any litigation is precluded. Second, it decides a question on the merits, subject to whatever relitigation constraints the state conviction entails. There can be Regard
expressed at either step. Having settled on minimal Regard at Step 1,151
Brown set out to define the conditions for relitigation—including some
Regard—at Step 2.152 In other words, Brown made clear that Regard for a
state conviction would be expressed in the Step 2 merits inquiry and not in
the Step 1 determination of whether there was a procedural defect in the
147 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Address, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as
the Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, November 22, 2004, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 409 (2004); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
2331, 2423 (1993).
148 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (“State
adjudication of questions of law cannot, under the habeas corpus statute, be accepted as
binding.”); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (presenting Brown as a
pivotal moment for the preclusion question); John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital
Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 440 (2011) (same).
149 Brown, 344 U.S. at 513 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
150 Id. at 510.
151 Id. at 500.
152 The thrust of the Step 2-centric opinion appears in six numbered subsections. Id. at
502–08. The Step 2 Regard generally took the form of deference to procedurally sound
state fact determinations. See id. at 506–08.
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state claim adjudication. In permitting Step 2 merits review notwithstanding
sound state procedure, however, the Relitigation paradigm involved a substantially reduced level of inter-jurisdictional preclusion, at least as compared
with the inter-jurisdictionally preclusive scope of a civil judgment.
2.

Forfeited Claims

Legal institutions honoring the Relitigation paradigm also refused to
incorporate forfeiture rules developed in the appellate Regard Scenario.
Brown dealt with claims that state courts actually denied on the merits, and
was decided near the beginning of Chief Justice Warren’s tenure. By the end
of it, the Supreme Court had marbled criminal procedure with constitutional
law,153 and so the number of claims capable of being lodged on direct or
collateral review rose dramatically. Because of the growth and change in constitutional content, the Warren Court ultimately had to fashion relitigation
principles for forfeited claims—i.e., issues that state courts had not decided
on the merits in either direct review or state post-conviction proceedings.
For the decade after Brown, many courts believed that, under Daniels v. Allen
(a Brown companion case),154 state forfeiture precluded federal habeas
consideration.155
In Fay v. Noia,156 the Supreme Court rejected the forfeiture rule for
appeals. It announced that an inmate could obtain (Step 2) merits review if
the inmate had not “deliberately by-passed” a state remedy.157 Noia is generally considered the high-water mark of federal habeas relitigation; the Court
has overturned Noia’s formal holding and disavowed its ethos in the decades
since.158 Authored by Justice Brennan, the opinion recites a stilted history,159 but it nevertheless captures the day’s dominant habeas paradigm.
Noia held that nothing about a procedurally defaulted claim deprived a federal court of jurisdiction to entertain it.160
Noia explicitly rejected certain Regard principles developed for appellate review of state convictions.161 Under some views of the pre-Noia forfeiture rule, a claim was procedurally defaulted if there were adequate-and153 See infra notes 179–80.
154 Daniels v. Allen, reported sub nom. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 510 (1953) (opinion
of Frankfurter, J.).
155 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (describing
majority opinion as “negating” Daniels).
156 372 U.S. 391.
157 See id. at 438.
158 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (formally overruling Noia and
explaining its diminished influence).
159 See Noia, 372 U.S. at 399–414; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 985 n.227 (2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS
CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010)) (“Forests have been felled over Justice Brennan’s reading of the history of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 . . . .”).
160 See Noia, 372 U.S. at 426.
161 See id. at 429 (“The fatal weakness of this contention is its failure to recognize that
the adequate state-ground rule is a function of the limitations of appellate review.”).
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independent state grounds (AAISG) to sustain the state order denying
relief.162 Very roughly speaking, a state procedural rule is “adequate” if it is
firmly established and regularly followed,163 and it is “independent” (of federal law) if it is not intertwined with the underlying federal claim.164 Adequacy and independence are established constraints on the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to conduct direct review of state judgments.165
The basic logic of the AAISG rule is that it forecloses the Supreme Court’s
appellate review of federal issues that do not dictate the outcome of a dispute;166 if there is an AAISG, then there is no Article III case or controversy.167 In Noia, however, the Court refused to incorporate the AAISG rule
as a constraint on habeas relitigation, believing that the habeas rule should
reflect the Regard Scenario at issue in an inter-jurisdictional preclusion
inquiry.168 The touchstone of Article III habeas power is simply custody;169
state forfeiture does not moot the case or controversy.
3.

Factual Predicates

The Relitigation paradigm also suppressed the inter-jurisdictionally
preclusive effect of predicate fact determinations. In Brown, Justice Frankfurter explained that if the state record was “inadequate to show how the
State court decided the relevant historical facts, the District Court shall use
appropriate procedures, including a hearing if necessary, to decide the
issues.”170 Note the basic sequence of federal process: a (Step 1) preclusion
rule based on the reliability of the state proceeding, followed by a (Step 2)
determination of fact simpliciter. At several other points throughout the opinion, Justice Frankfurter outlined a basic two-step fact-determination process,
with the first step being a preclusion rule focused on procedural sufficiency.
Justice Frankfurter explained that, “[u]nless a vital flaw be found in the process of ascertaining such facts in the State court, the District Judge may
accept their determination in the State proceeding and deny the
application.”171
Noia had been decided in 1963, and was the zenith of the Relitigation
paradigm—at least for the federal judiciary. That year, the Supreme Court
also decided Townsend v. Sain,172 which filled out the two-step process for
relitigating facts. Townsend particularized Brown’s “vital flaw” language by
specifying six scenarios under which federal fact-finding was mandatory: (1)
162 See id. at 398 (describing lower court opinion).
163 See Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316–17 (2011).
164 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991).
165 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041–42 (1983).
166 See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
167 See Long, 463 U.S. at 1041–42.
168 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429 (1963).
169 See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730.
170 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 503 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
171 Id. at 506.
172 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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where the state failed to resolve the facts in dispute; (2) when the record “as
a whole” did not support the state factual determination; (3) where the state
fact-finding procedures were inadequate to afford a full-and-fair hearing; (4)
in the face of substantial allegations involving newly discovered evidence; (5)
if there was a failure to develop material facts at a state hearing; or (6) if “for
any reason” the state trial court did not afford a full-and-fair fact hearing.173
The particularized rules set forth a two-step process for factual development
typical of the Relitigation paradigm. Scenarios (1), (3), (5), and (6) go
directly to the quintessential relitigation question of whether the state procedures produce reliable outcomes. Scenario (4) requires a federal hearing
when the state inmate might show the state determination to be incorrect
through evidence extrinsic to the state record. Only Scenario (2) looks anything like appellate review for correctness, as it requires a federal court to
evaluate whether the state record supports the state finding. Several attributes of Townsend express a forgiving Relitigation model. First, a (Step 1) conclusion that the state court “correctly” evaluated the state record was never
sufficient to preclude (Step 2) consideration on the merits. Second, of the
six particularized scenarios sufficient to require (Step 2) merits consideration,
five have nothing to do with “review” of the state outcome in light of the state
record.
Congress modified a few parts of Townsend in 1966 legislation,174 and
committed federal habeas process to an even less restrictive Relitigation paradigm. As with claims forfeited on the merits, the availability of federal habeas
process for fact relitigation was presumed. The question was simply whether,
at Step 2, Regard took the form of a presumption of correctness attached to
express state findings or not. The statute specified eight scenarios when a
presumption, itself capable of being overcome by clear and convincing evidence, vanished.175 Seven of those scenarios did not involve “review” of the
state conviction, and instead focused on whether the state process tended to
produce reliable outcomes.176 Only the eighth involved any substantive
review of whether the state finding was correct in light of the record.177 The
same two observations I made about Townsend apply to the successor provision. First, that a state court correctly or fairly resolved a factual issue in light
of the state record was never sufficient to bar merits review of the claim. Second, of the eight statutorily specified scenarios for relaxing a presumption in
favor of the state finding at Step 2, seven were process-oriented and had
nothing whatsoever to do with the correctness of the state determination.
***
The four markers of the Relitigation paradigm—strictly divided preclusion and merits inquiries, preclusion bars disabled by showings of unreliable
173 Id. at 313 (quoting Brown, 344 U.S. at 503 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).
174 Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat. 1104, 1105–06.
175 See id. §§ (2)(d)(1)–(d)(8).
176 See id. §§ (2)(d)(1)–(d)(7)
177 See id. § (2)(d)(7).
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state process, consideration of evidence outside the state record, and a granular definition of “claim”—dominated many different types of Warren-era
habeas inquires. Collectively, they constitute a process-oriented habeas jurisprudence in which unreliable state procedure was a sufficient-but-not-necessary
condition for merits review of a habeas claim.
Moreover, the markers are consistent with the familiar proposition that
state convictions are less preclusive than ordinary civil judgments. The manner of proving that proposition, however—isolating the preclusion constructs
from laws withholding jurisdiction or a cause of action—is crucial. Such
methodology enables the appropriate apples-to-apples comparison between
preclusion rules for state convictions and those for other types of judgments.
In Part III, I perform the same comparison with Roberts-era habeas process,
and that result upends the conventional wisdom animating modern restrictions on relief.
III.

THE APPELLATE PARADIGM

The first major crack in the Relitigation paradigm appeared in 1963,
when the Harvard Law Review published Professor Bator’s Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners.178 Professor Bator’s article
crystallized an insurgent critique of the era’s criminal process “revolution[ ],”
establishing finality as a formidable presence in modern habeas discourse.
The Warren Court had been announcing new rights of criminal procedure,179 incorporating them against the states,180 and enlisting lower federal
178 Bator, supra note 8, at 475.
179 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (barring the use of out-of-court
identification based on unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228–39 (1967) (requiring that defendant have counsel at post-indictment line-up); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment requires that suspects be warned prior to custodial interrogation); Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (announcing that the Fifth Amendment “forbids
either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court
that such silence is evidence of guilt”); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965) (recognizing a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross examine trial witnesses); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (imposing a Sixth Amendment
bar against using incriminating statements that law enforcement deliberately elicited after
indictment and in counsel’s absence); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 90–91 (1963)
(announcing prosecutors’ duty to disclose exculpatory evidence); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (entitling an indigent defendant to appointed counsel during
any mandatory state appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956) (Black, J., plurality opinion) (giving indigent defendants rights to free trial transcripts to ensure adequate
appellate consideration).
180 See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795–96 (1969) (Fifth Amendment
double jeopardy rule); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159–62 (1968) (Sixth Amendment jury trial right in non-petty criminal cases); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18
(1967) (Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 225–26 (1967) (Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee); Pointer, 380 U.S. at
403 (Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111
(1964) (Fourth Amendment warrant requirement); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964)
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courts to enforce them in habeas proceedings.181 Professor Bator argued
forcefully that giving inmates an unrestricted federal habeas forum improperly neglected interests in finality and comity that should be honored after a
criminal conviction becomes final.182 The specter of serial relitigation provoked Bator-inflected responses on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.183
And, if modern habeas law is contoured by reference to a Batorian finality
interest,184 then its jagged edge is AEDPA185—the most restrictive post-conviction legislation Congress has ever passed. The Roberts Court continues to
embrace finality so energetically as to invite speculation about whether legal
institutions perceive a logical stopping point.
Contrary to the innumerable references to habeas process as a “res judicata exception,” a criminal conviction is now more inter-jurisdictionally
preclusive than is an ordinary civil judgment. That surprising state of affairs
exists because, I argue, the logic and idiom of appellate review have displaced
the Relitigation paradigm as the dominant theoretical framework that legal
institutions use to construct and administer habeas process. The Appellate
paradigm actually eschews process-oriented preclusion concepts in favor of
those developed for appellate review of criminal cases. The mix of new
Appellate-paradigm and surviving Relitigation-paradigm rules constitutes,
broadly speaking, a habeas regime that is designed to promote comity and
finality by incorporating each model’s most restrictive features.
A.

Essentializing Appellate Review in Criminal Cases

Authors can credibly put the “Law of Judgments” in title case. The Law
of Judgments is the subject of two Restatements,186 as is its conceptual
(Fifth Amendment Miranda rules); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33–34 (1963) (Clark, J.,
plurality opinion) (Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement for searches and
seizures); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in all felony cases); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667–68 (1962) (Eighth
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653
(1961) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
181 See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1041 (1977). This proposition went hand in glove with the
recognition that the Supreme Court could not enforce these incorporated rights using
traditional review. See Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991,
1008 (1985).
182 See infra Section IV.A.
183 See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (citing Professor Bator);
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492 (1991) (same); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309
(1989) (same); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986) (same); Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107, 127 n.32 (1982) (same); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 337 n.12 (1979)
(same).
184 Many of the legislative proposals developed during the second half of the twentieth
century were also riffs on Bator’s model. See Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality,
and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 460–62, 502–07 (2007).
185 Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26.
186 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (AM. LAW INST. 1982); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS (AM. LAW INST. 1942).
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cousin, Conflict of Laws.187 By contrast, there are laws of appellate review
but no “Law of Appellate Review.” Appellate process lacks qualities conducive to its treatment as an atomic unit of legal analysis. It is not a body of
substantive rules like Contract or Trust Law, and its procedural features lack
the trans-substantivity of Arbitration or Judgments Law.188
The major trans-substantive feature of appellate review is that it is not
something else: an exercise of original or collateral jurisdiction. It is direct
review of an inferior court or administrative body.189 Beyond that shared
attribute, the objectives and manner of appellate process vary enormously.
For example, when a federal court reviews a federal agency, the objectives of
and process for that review share little in common with those for a state court
reviewing a tort judgment in favor of an assault victim.190 That one cannot
essentialize all appellate review does not exclude the possibility that some
categories of appellate process nonetheless hang together in ways that warrant title-case treatment.
When I use the term “Appellate paradigm,” I refer to the transdoctrinal
practice of appellate review in criminal cases.191 That Appellate paradigm has
three features: (1) “outcome orientation,” which means error is not reversible if it is “harmless” and therefore a nondispositive feature of the prior
judgment;192 (2) “intrinsicality,” by which I mean that the appellate decision
is made in light of the record before the trial court;193 and (3) “deference,”
which means that a higher court puts a thumb on the scale in favor of trial
determinations.194 Using outcome orientation, intrinsicality, and deference
as markers, Part III makes the case that facets of the Appellate model are now
staples of federal habeas process.
Some luminaries have observed more generally that the Supreme Court
has swapped its own appellate review for a lower court habeas remedy.195 My
187

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1971); RESTATE(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1935).
188 Arbitration Law is the subject of its own Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
189 See Ira Mickenberg, Abusing the Exceptions and Regulations Clause: Legislative Attempts to
Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 497, 517 (1983).
190 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 1000–02 (2011) (explaining
how an Appellate model for judicial review of agency action might not fit institutional
reality).
191 Trans-substantivity means that a procedure operates similarly across different bodies
of substantive law. See supra note 6. I use the term “transdoctrinality” to refer to procedure
that operates similarly across doctrines within a substantive body of law.
192 The most familiar such doctrine is “harmless error,” although there are many
others. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 79, 83–111 (1988).
193 See Merrill, supra note 190, at 998.
194 See Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 512 (2008).
195 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts,
1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 87 (“Less obviously, federal courts perform an essentially appellate
function in reviewing petitions for writs of habeas corpus from state prisoners.” (citing
MENT
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descriptive argument (Part III) differs significantly and my normative argument (Part IV) differs entirely from prior accounts. First, I remain agnostic
as to how well the Appellate model works as a descriptive or normative theory
of writ scope.196 Second, prior Appellate model entries are not oriented heavily towards the paradigm’s limits, as I am here.197 Finally, I am not invested
in showing that the federal courts are switching entirely to a habeas process
defined by direct-review features. I am most interested in the drift and its
selectivity.
B.

Historical Pedigree and Practical Appeal

Two features of the American criminal-process experience made the
Appellate model desirable. First, there was a superficially accessible body of
precedent decided in an appellate Regard Scenario: for almost a century, the
Supreme Court had actually used its habeas power as a vehicle to conduct
direct review of federal criminal convictions.198 Second, because the Warren
Court substantially expanded the definition of unlawful custody by announcing new criminal procedure rights,199 there was hydraulic pressure to have
lower federal courts use habeas process to enforce them in a direct-reviewlike way.
1.

Supreme Court Appeals

The Appellate model became increasingly attractive in part because of
changes to the basic structure of Supreme Court review. As highlighted in
Part I, an appellate-like habeas writ had in fact been a durable direct-review
vehicle before state-inmate relief created modern preclusion questions.200
The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not give federal defendants an as-of-right
Friedman, supra note 93)); Friedman, supra note 93, at 254 (“Accordingly, the federal
habeas courts were to act as surrogates for the United States Supreme Court through
habeas review, in effect exercising appellate jurisdiction over state criminal proceedings.”);
Liebman, supra note 102, at 2096 (“Simply recognizing that the scope and nature of
habeas corpus review almost exactly parallel, and substitute for, the Court’s own review on
direct appeal may satisfy some that federal-question review in criminal cases should remain
as it is.”).
196 In other words, I take no position as to whether the Appellate model influences the
types of claims that are cognizable on habeas process. Cf., e.g., Friedman, supra note 93, at
277–88, 331–40 (emphasizing writ scope alongside other phenomena).
197 Indeed, predecessors who observed Appellate-paradigm features seem to focus on
how they facilitate an expanded remedy. See, e.g., id. at 331 (“The [Appellate] model recognizes this review for what it is: a surrogate for the direct review that the Supreme Court
could no longer meaningfully provide for every criminal case.”).
198 See, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 163–64 (1873) (relying on a combination of original habeas writ and common-law certiorari petition); Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 75 (1807) (same); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 448 (1806)
(same).
199 See supra note 179.
200 See supra subsection I.C.1.
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appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases,201 but it did authorize habeas
consideration of federal custody.202 As a result, the Court began to use its
original habeas power as a vehicle for entertaining what amounted to appeals
from federal convictions.203 The Supreme Court could not exercise such
power by reference to its Article III original jurisdiction—limited to cases or
controversies between states and those involving foreign envoys204—so it
exercised that power pursuant to the Article III grant of appellate jurisdiction.
Insofar as the Supreme Court was using the original habeas writ as a form of
appellate power, it was constrained by constitutional limits on its appellate
authority. The Marshall Court articulated all sorts of limits on its original
habeas power (including Watkins), and was not especially careful to specify
which restrictions were appellate-jurisdiction limits and which restrictions
inhered in habeas process.205 The Supreme Court continued to use its original habeas power as a direct-review vehicle until 1925,206 but only for federal
criminal convictions. That channel persisted not because habeas was a good
fit for the desired function, but because there were no other options. That
some appellate-jurisdiction rules have been re-expressed as habeas rules is
not, therefore, surprising.
Shortly after federal habeas process became generally available to state
prisoners in 1867,207 Congress stripped the Supreme Court of traditional
appellate authority to review the state-inmate cases.208 At that time, lower
courts were in the awkward role of making final, unreviewable pronouncements on important questions of federal law. The Supreme Court gestured
at the idea of using its original habeas power to review state-inmate cases, but
it never actually ordered a discharge. In 1885, Congress reinstated the
Court’s more conventional authority over the state-inmate cases,209 providing
it with its first opportunity to opine on that type of habeas power.210 When
the Court started regularly deciding the scope of state-inmate relief at that
time, it did so in an environment where its direct-review authority over the
conviction itself remained a viable mechanism for enforcing federal law in all

201 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84; see also Oaks, supra note 30, at
177–79. A right of appeal was added in 1803. See Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 40, § 2, 2 Stat.
244.
202 See § 14, 1 Stat. 81–82.
203 See Kovarsky, supra note 36, at 68–69.
204 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
205 See supra subsection I.C.2.
206 See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
207 See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
208 See Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44.
209 See Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
210 The first case decided in the new posture was Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886);
see also Bator, supra note 8, at 478–83 (discussing what Professor Bator describes as the
“Early ‘State’ Cases”).
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cases.211 Habeas review for state inmates was therefore a secondary mechanism for ensuring lawful custody. That situation changed in 1925, when Congress replaced as-of-right appeals in state criminal cases with the modern writ
of certiorari.212 Only then did lower federal courts become the exclusive
forum for enforcing federal rights in many state criminal cases.
2.

Expanding Bases for Unlawful Custody

The Appellate model also got substantial traction when the substantive
scope of due process expanded. Before the Supreme Court began using the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to incorporate rights against
the states, there were few grounds upon which to assert that custody was
unlawful. The major grounds upon which an inmate could obtain relief were
the absence of jurisdiction to convict,213 conviction under an unconstitutional statute,214 or a double jeopardy violation.215 Over the course of several cases that still drive much debate over the modern writ’s scope—
discussed in Part II—the Supreme Court decided that other due process violations could also render convictions unlawful and therefore subject to
habeas challenge.216
The Supreme Court eventually began using the Due Process Clause to
incorporate rights against the states just as Congress developed the modern
system of (discretionary) certiorari review.217 The result was pressure on the
Court to find a substitute for its review of state criminal convictions,218 and
lower court habeas process fit the bill.
211 See Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims
Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 315, 339.
212 See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 237, 43 Stat 936, 937.
213 See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830).
214 See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879).
215 See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1873).
216 See supra Section II.A (discussing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), and Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915)); see also, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938)
(referring to deprivation of due process rights as “power and authority” (i.e., jurisdiction)
withheld from the court). Compare, e.g., Bator, supra note 8, at 483–93 (extracting from
Frank and Moore a rule that habeas jurisdiction only extended to certain types of unremedied due process violations), with Peller, supra note 102, at 644–48 (arguing that, through
Frank and Moore, the Court established that habeas could be a remedy for due process
violations).
217 For a catalogue of the due process rights, see supra note 179. The most recognizable form of the statutory certiorari writ appeared for the first time in 1925. See Judiciary
Act of 1925, ch. 229, §§ 237–40, 43 Stat. 936, 937–39.
218 See Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 589 (2014). In
the early twentieth century, Congress had replaced as-of-right Supreme Court review with a
discretionary vehicle: the modern writ of certiorari. The most recognizable form of the
statutory certiorari writ appeared for the first time in 1925. See Judiciary Act of 1925
§§ 237–40.
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Appellate Paradigm Features

Habeas law now conforms largely to an Appellate model, and evidence
of the drift is detectable in each of the three inquires that had formerly
reflected Relitigation-model thinking: (1) rules for claims that state courts
decide on the merits; (2) process on forfeited claims; and (3) fact-finding.
Moreover, the shift appears to reflect some selectivity: lawmakers are borrowing only the most restrictive features of the Appellate paradigm and have
styled them as limits on the habeas remedy. The most salient change is the
switch from a process-oriented preclusion inquiry to an outcome-oriented
inquiry about whether custody is reasonable. There is nothing inherently
wrong with selecting the most restrictive features available, but one must recognize that the organizing objective is restriction itself, and not some other
legal construct.
1.

Claims Decided on the Merits

AEDPA, passed in 1996, remains the practical starting point for any federal post-conviction litigation. The way courts and scholars refer to AEDPA’s
centerpiece, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), reflects the change associated with the
Appellate paradigm—they call it a “standard of review.”219 Section 2254(d)
provides:
[A state-inmate petition] shall not be granted with respect to any claim
that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.220

The text of the statute formally imposes a relitigation rule; federal
habeas relief “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudi219 See, e.g., White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1704 (2014) (describing § 2254(d) as a
“standard of review”); Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1097 (2013) (same); Hardy v.
Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 495 (2011) (per curiam) (same); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.
370, 389 (2010) (same); Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 155 (2010) (same); Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 114 (2009) (same); Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 269, 272 (2002)
(per curiam) (same); see also, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the
Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791, 812 n.74 (2009) (same); Hoffstadt, supra note 19, at 1218 (same); Huq, supra note 218, at 537 (same); Allan Ides, Habeas
Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme
Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677, 692 (2003) (same). The Supreme Court has
intermittently described § 2254(d) as a bar on relitigation. See, e.g., Greene v. Fisher, 132
S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86 (2011).
220 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
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cated on the merits in State court” (Step 2) unless an inmate can satisfy one
of the two subsections (Step 1).221 In practice, however, courts have constructed § 2254(d) to impose the most restrictive features of the Appellate
paradigm: outcome orientation, intrinsicality, and deference.
First, federal courts have largely adopted an outcome-oriented reading
of § 2254(d), in which even severely defective state process does not permit
relitigation of a constitutional claim; instead, the outcome of the state adjudication must be unacceptable to every fair-minded jurist.222 Every federal
appellate jurisdiction has either endorsed or seriously flirted with an “ultimate conclusion” rule—the idea that the actual reasoning of a state court
does not affect the § 2254(d) inquiry.223 The ultimate-conclusion rule
means that a federal court effectively determines whether a reasonable jurist
could deny the underlying claim, as opposed to whether the state court’s
actual decisional processes were reasonable. The Supreme Court has formally imposed an ultimate-conclusion rule for summary state orders denying
state post-conviction relief.224 Reliable state process, which is a touchstone of
ordinary inter-jurisdictional preclusion inquiry and is a necessary condition
to foreclose merits review under the Relitigation model, is increasingly irrelevant to federal habeas relief.225 The Appellate paradigm is, in this respect, a
fundamental rejection of Professor Bator’s premise that “if the state’s findings are to ‘count,’ they must be reasoned findings rationally reached
through fair procedures.”226
Second, the Supreme Court has required Appellate-model intrinsicality
for any § 2254(d) inquiry, although no statutory text seems to impose that
restriction on § 2254(d)(1). The plain text of § 2254(d)(2) imposes an
intrinsicality principle for factual unreasonability: a state inmate avoids
§ 2254(d) if the state adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.”227 Section 2254(d)(1)—the “legal unreasonable221 Id.
222 See infra notes 223–38 and accompanying text.
223 See, e.g., Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 837 (8th Cir. 2012); Gill v. Mecusker, 633
F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2011); Clements v. Clarke, 592 F.3d 45, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2010);
Holder v. Palmer, 588 F.3d 328, 341 (6th Cir. 2009); Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847, 855
(4th Cir. 2003), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 357 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2004); Jackson v.
Ray, 390 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2004); Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (per curiam); Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002);
Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2001); Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 180 n.3 (3d
Cir. 1998); Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997). But see Early v. Packer,
537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam) (rejecting ultimate-conclusion rule for formal
§ 2254(d)(1) analysis under “contrary to” clause (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
405–06 (2000) (O’Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part))).
224 See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101–02 (2011).
225 But see Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282–83 (2015) (refusing to “defer” to
state court on element of claim upon which state court did not expressly rule).
226 Bator, supra note 8, at 489.
227 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
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ness” rule—lacks the express intrinsicality constraint appearing in its statutory neighbor. In Cullen v. Pinholster,228 the Supreme Court nonetheless held
that an inmate cannot use evidence outside the state record to satisfy it.229
Pinholster presented the question as a pure Appellate-paradigm issue:
“whether review under § 2254(d)(1) permits consideration of evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing before the federal habeas court.”230 Appellate-model intrinsicality is considerably more restrictive than the interjurisdictional preclusion rule for ordinary civil judgments, the validity of
which may be attacked using evidence outside the F1 record.231
Third, § 2254(d) incorporates Appellate-paradigm deference by requiring, as a Step 1 condition for even getting to the Step 2 merits inquiry, an
inmate to show that a state’s disposition of a claim is unreasonable. In other
words, under AEDPA, deference attaches during the (Step 1) preclusion
inquiry itself.232 Before AEDPA, deference was simply the result of a Step 1
inquiry resolved in a state’s favor.233 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
recently issued a slew of decisions interpreting § 2254(d) to require substantially elevated deference levels—holding that a state decision is reasonable as
long as any fair-minded jurist might agree with it.234 Finally, Appellate-paradigm deference surfaces in how federal courts proceed at Step 2, after a
determination that an inmate avoids § 2254(d). Under the statute’s text,
§ 2254(a) should kick in and a federal court appears to be required to consider the claim simpliciter.235 Even when a state inmate avoids § 2254(d),
however, some federal courts still consider themselves to be “reviewing” state
decisions rather than deciding claims.236 For ordinary civil judgments, by
228 563 U.S. 170 (2011).
229 Id. at 181. In Pinholster, the Court did attempt to anchor the rule in the text of the
statute. Because the statute used the “backward-looking” past-tense verbs “resulted in” and
“involved,” the Court explained, the federal inquiry must be limited to the record in existence at the time the state decision was made. Id. at 182.
230 Id. at 180. (emphasis added).
231 See Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 468 (1873); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 77 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
232 Even if one conceptualized state post-conviction review as a determination of validity to which some sort of preclusion attached, that rule would still be more restrictive than
what controls in civil judgment cases. See Whitman, 85 U.S. at 467–68.
233 See supra subsection II.B.1.
234 Compare Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (equating unreasonableness
with no “fair-minded jurist[ ]” standard (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,
664 (2004))), with Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 377–78 (2000) (rejecting “all reasonable jurists” standard); see also White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1703 (2014) (citing Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (same).
235 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012) is the general grant of post-conviction authority over
state-inmate cases.
236 One example involves the Supreme Court’s decision, under Atkins v. Virginia, that
intellectually disabled offenders are ineligible for execution. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
Some states continue to define intellectual disability using their own rules of decision. See,
e.g., Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (identifying seven evidentiary factors to be used to decide intellectual disability claims in Texas post-conviction pro-
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contrast, if the F1 process is insufficient to satisfy Step 1, there is no deference at Step 2. The F2 court simply treats the F1 judgment as invalid, and
must therefore make a determination on the merits of the underlying issue.
For claims that state courts decide on the merits, the Appellate paradigm
confuses courts into thinking that an unreasonableness finding entails
relief.237 The federal reporters wheeze with alarm at the idea that state convictions are void if an inmate satisfies a § 2254(d) exception.238 Of course,
an inmate avoiding § 2254(d) is supposed to get only an unencumbered merits adjudication in federal court, not a new criminal trial or a discharge. The
cumulative effect of the Appellate-paradigm influence is unmistakable.
Pinholster (intrinsicality) combines with the ultimate-conclusion rule (outcome orientation) and the Supreme Court’s no fair-minded jurist standard
(deference) to form an almost insurmountable § 2254(d) hurdle: a state
inmate must show that no reasonable jurist could accept the state court’s
ultimate conclusion, based only on the state record.
2.

Forfeited Claims

In subsection II.B.2, I presented forfeiture law (procedural default) as a
major feature of the Relitigation paradigm. It has subsequently developed
quintessential Appellate-paradigm features. I devote more attention to forfeiture law than to two other procedural restrictions on modern federal postconviction relief: the writ-abuse rules and the limitations period.239 Abusivewrit rules implicate a different Regard Scenario—the preclusive effect of a
prior federal habeas proceeding rather than a prior state conviction.240 The
statute of limitations might be fertile ground for insight as to paradigm drift,
but it did not exist until 1996.241 Forfeiture law and the evidentiary rules
explored in subsections II.B.2 and II.B.3 are the best test cases because they
operate in the appropriate Regard Scenario and they have been around long
enough to evaluate change longitudinally.
Appellate-paradigm features of § 2254(d) are a combination of judicial
and legislative innovation, but modern procedural default law is all judges.
ceedings). When Atkins claimants from some of those states avoid § 2254(d), there are
federal courts that continue to “review” the state Atkins decision rather than decide the
federal claim. See, e.g., Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying Texas
rule of decision to Atkins claim).
237 See, e.g., Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1706 (“Section 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for
instances in which a state court unreasonably applies this Court’s precedent . . . .”).
238 See, e.g., Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148, 1152 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To our knowledge, the Supreme Court has never granted habeas relief solely on the basis of the ‘reasoning’ used by the state court.”); Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(per curiam) (“Similarly, we do not interpret AEDPA in such a way that would require a
federal habeas court to order a new sentencing hearing solely because it finds the state
court’s written opinion unsatisfactory.” (footnote omitted)).
239 I disfavor the use of the term “procedural” to describe this group of restrictions
because it, by negative implication, treats § 2254(d) as a “substantive” limit on relief.
240 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
241 See id. § 2244(d) (1996).
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Courts developed it to screen certain claims forfeited in state litigation from
federal habeas consideration.242 State inmates must exhaust state remedies,243 but they procedurally default the claim if, in the course of such
exhaustion, they would (or do) lose on a state procedural ground.244 Procedural default doctrine has been a fixture in habeas jurisprudence for over
half a century, but Congress has never tinkered with it.245
In 1977, the Supreme Court reconstructed the forfeiture rules using an
Appellate model. Wainwright v. Sykes established that the AAISG rule for
direct appeals—a restriction on the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
that I skeletally outlined in subsection II.B.2—also restricted habeas consideration of forfeited claims.246 In the terminology I have developed here, it
transformed AAISG from a rule of Regard for direct-review cases into a rule
of Regard for inter-jurisdictional preclusion cases. The Court stated very
matter-of-factly: “[I]t is a well-established principle of federalism that a state
decision resting on an adequate foundation of state substantive law is
immune from review in the federal courts.”247 The Court cited Murdock v.
City of Memphis248 and Fox Film Corp. v. Muller249—two cases about limits on
Supreme Court review.250 The negative implication of that citation selection
is obvious; there was no precedent indicating that an AAISG rule restricted
Article III jurisdiction common to all federal courts. That concept was new,
and a little under-developed. The collateral AAISG constraint is nonjurisdictional,251 and Noia contains a detailed discussion of the policy differences
between a rule constraining the Supreme Court’s Article III appellate power
over state judgments and a rule constraining habeas power common to all
federal courts.252 In Sykes, there is no such discussion.
Sykes reflects an Appellate-paradigm shift not only in how it defines
default, but also in how it defines whether default is excused. Under postSykes law, a state inmate excuses default by showing cause for and prejudice
from the forfeiture.253 Under Noia, there was no prejudice element. The
Supreme Court has not defined “prejudice” precisely, but it requires generally that there may be no merits consideration unless the constitutional error
242 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87–88 (1977) (overruling Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 439 (1963)).
243 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2012).
244 See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).
245 See Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 336
(2010).
246 433 U.S. 72.
247 Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
248 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
249 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
250 Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81.
251 The federal court is reviewing custody, not a judgment. See Lambrix v. Singletary,
520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997).
252 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426–35 (1963).
253 See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012).
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was sufficiently likely to have influenced a prior outcome.254 It performs
roughly the same function as does a harmless-error rule on direct review.255
Prejudice is therefore a straightforward source of outcome orientation, one
of the Appellate-paradigm staples.256
3.

Factual Predicates

The Appellate-paradigm drift also surfaces in the factual predicate cases.
Under pre-AEDPA law, detailed in subsection II.B.3, the federal fact-finding
restrictions worked like an issue-preclusion rule conditioned on the reliability of F1 process. Under both Townsend (1963) and the corresponding statutory revision (1966), issue preclusion attached only if none of the specified
exceptions in the laundry list were satisfied.257 For both Townsend and the
statute, all but one of the special exceptions were process-oriented.258 Moreover, the outcome-oriented exception was not something that a state inmate
had to satisfy in addition to a process-oriented one, but was a separate and
sufficient gateway. Consistent with the Relitigation paradigm, deference was
a result of a successful (Step 1) showing that the F1 proceeding was procedurally reliable, not something that attached as part of that inquiry.
Post-AEDPA federal fact-finding rules reflect confusion about how Relitigation-paradigm principles survive in an Appellate-paradigm world. AEDPA
excised the statutory laundry list and swapped in two other provisions relating to state fact determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) is a (Step 1) preclusion
rule that permits an inmate to obtain (Step 2) merits consideration if the
state adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.”259 Section 2254(e) contains rules for finding facts, which
(before Pinholster) a federal court might have done at Step 1 or Step 2.260
As was the case with the § 2254(d)(1) legal-unreasonability rule, federal
courts have constructed the § 2254(d)(2) factual-unreasonability rule using
basic Appellate-paradigm principles. The first Appellate-paradigm feature
evident from post-AEDPA law is deference. Before AEDPA, a state fact-finding error would disable the (Step 1) preclusion rule.261 Section 2254(d)(2),
however, now incorporates deference by requiring that the fact-finding error
254

See 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PRO§ 26.3[c], at 1507–16 (6th ed. 2011).
255 See id. at 1509–12; John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and
Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 684 (1990).
256 See supra note 192. There is no harmless error inquiry in traditional preclusion law.
See Richard B. Kennelly, Jr., Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal
Cases, 80 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1408 (1994).
257 See supra subsection II.B.3.
258 See supra subsection II.B.3.
259 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2012).
260 See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
261 See supra subsection II.B.3.

CEDURE
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be unreasonable.262 After AEDPA, an inmate seeking federal merits consideration must show more than F1 fact-finding error; deference means that the
error must be severe.
The textual source of any outcome orientation is murkier, and so the
judiciary’s role in promoting it is greater. Nothing in § 2254(d)(2) appears
to exclude inquiry into the procedural integrity of the F1 fact-finding process; in fact, the provision permits relitigation if a state decision was “based
on” an unreasonable fact determination.263 With some exceptions, however,
the federal courts have disfavored a process-oriented reading of
§ 2254(d)(2), opting instead for an outcome-oriented standard involving the
correctness of the result.264 Although the Supreme Court has held that a
state procedural failure rising to the level of a procedural due process violation can disable § 2254(d),265 it does not do so under § 2254(d)(2). Instead,
the due process violation is an “antecedent unreasonable application” of law
under § 2254(d)(1),266 leaving lower court interpretation of § 2254(d)(2) as
a results-oriented rule intact.
The Appellate paradigm also manifests in the (Step 2) fact development
surrounding a claim. Before AEDPA, federal hearings were a matter of
largely unrestricted discretion.267 After AEDPA, even if an inmate clears
Step 1 by avoiding § 2254(d), (s)he is not entitled to a Step 2 evidentiary
hearing absent an outcome-oriented prejudice showing. The outcome orientation is expressed through § 2254(e)(2), which conditions an evidentiary
hearing on a showing that “the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense.”268 Whether evaluating it by reference to the conditions
for preclusion at Step 1 or merits determination at Step 2, fact-finding is
increasingly treated as part of a habeas process in which federal courts review
a state decision rather than entertain relitigation of a constitutional claim.269
***
Most courts and observers incorrectly treat modern habeas restrictions
as a return to a more ordinary preclusion rule.270 The Appellate-paradigm
262 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
263 Id.
264 See supra notes 223–38 and accompanying text.
265 See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007).
266 Id. at 953.
267 See Larry W. Yackle, Federal Evidentiary Hearings Under the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 6
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 135, 138 (1996).
268 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
269 See Abigail L. Kite, Note, The Fact-Finding Process Review Model: Remedying Fact-Based
Constitutional Challenges on Federal Habeas Corpus Review, 31 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 351, 354–57
(2009).
270 See, e.g., Philip C. Chronakis, Cold Comfort for Change: Trends of Preclusion in Habeas
Corpus Litigation, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 17, 22 (1998) (“What we have now is a habeas
corpus framework in which state criminal convictions contain nearly the same preclusive
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ideas that now suffuse the habeas process are actually considerably more
restrictive than are the standard inter-jurisdictional preclusion rules that
apply to civil judgments. To be sure, modern habeas law retains certain features of the Relitigation paradigm. The selectivity of that retention, however,
suggests that the animating principle is not actually an attempt to promote
doctrinal consistency, but to seek restriction for its own sake. Normative evaluation of the modern trend should therefore center on questions about
whether habeas restrictions are desirable, not about whether they conform to
the standard model.
The strongest arguments in favor of the Appellate paradigm would position its restrictions as a check on habeas law’s two most idiosyncratic interjurisdictional features. First, federal law guarantees a cause of action to
attack a state conviction,271 but there are no comparable guarantees for collateral challenges to civil judgments. Second, the remedy for a successful
habeas attack is a discharge in F1, whereas the remedy for a successful collateral attack on a civil judgment is simply non-enforcement in F2.
To illustrate these idiosyncrasies, consider a creditor with a Montana
(F1) money judgment that it seeks to enforce against a debtor in a California
(F2) court; or same-sex partners to a marriage validly celebrated in New York
(F1) who want that marriage recognized for the purposes of securing federal
(F2) benefits. Generally speaking, those paradigmatic inter-jurisdictional
preclusion issues—referred to as “recognition” and “enforcement”272—
involve the preclusive effect that an F1 judgment has in F2, and not the
enforceability of the F1 judgment in F1. The issue is simply whether California will issue a coercive order requiring the debtor to pay on the Montana
judgment or whether the federal government will award the benefits incidental to a marital relationship formed in New York.
In habeas cases, however, two things are different. First, F2 grants the F1
loser a cause of action to challenge the F1 judgment in F2; second, the F2
remedy reaches back into F1. Habeas relief entails a discharge, which voids
the F1 conviction entirely—even in the F1 jurisdiction. The extreme remedial consequence of a successful habeas action is one of the most urgent
reasons why federal law might overlook defective state process in post-conviction cases. The best argument for Appellate-paradigm restrictions is not that
they are consistent with standard preclusion models, but that they offset the
guaranteed access to a singularly harsh discharge remedy.

effects as do civil proceedings, where the preclusion doctrine is virtually insurmountable in
finality.”).
271 The federal habeas statute empowers federal courts to hear habeas causes in which
state inmates allege that they are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
272 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 93–98 (AM. LAW INST. 1971)
(recognition); id. §§ 99–102 (enforcement).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL203.txt

676

unknown

Seq: 40

notre dame law review

IV.

NORMATIVE CRITICISM

OF THE

19-JAN-17

9:33

[vol. 92:2

APPELLATE MODEL

Even with the justificatory revision I suggest, however, there are at least
three reasons to be skeptical of the Appellate model. First, because of its
outcome orientation, the Appellate paradigm does not comfortably inherit
the normative justifications for prior, Bator-influenced habeas restrictions.
Second, the Appellate paradigm compromises the dignitary and instrumental
values expressed through the legal ideal that every criminal defendant gets a
day in court. Finally, the Appellate paradigm may violate constitutional “antipuppeteering” norms against using procedural rules to mimic prohibited
rules of decision.
A.

The Comity and Finality Interests

As an initial matter, the outcome-oriented Appellate paradigm does not
actually share the established theoretical justifications of the restrictive but
process-oriented theories preceding it. Professor Bator’s full-and-fair model
is the template for virtually every legislative attempt to restrict the habeas
remedy since 1963,273 and it exerts similar influence on modern decisional
law.274 The model is built on a basic epistemic premise: the unknowability of
absolute truth.275 If ultimate legal or factual truth is unknowable,276 then
the validity of a decision denying a claim reduces to a question about
whether the underlying process was reliable.277 The law should not require
incremental federal habeas inquiry, the theory says, when the state criminal
process was sufficiently reliable to achieve truth-approximating results.278
Other than finality, the major interest invoked to justify restrictive stateinmate process is comity,279 which refers generally to an interest in having
one sovereign recognize and enforce laws of another.280 Professor Bator’s
model relies on a combination of comity and finality interests to urge a categorical preclusion rule for claims that were fully and fairly adjudicated in
state court.281 The comity and finality interests are deeply intertwined, inso273 See supra note 8.
274 See supra note 183 (collecting Supreme Court references to Professor Bator).
275 See Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, 87 WASH. L. REV.
139, 198 n.322 (2012).
276 See Bator, supra note 8, at 446–47.
277 See, e.g., id. at 448 (“The task of assuring legality is to define and create a set of
arrangements and procedures which provide a reasoned and acceptable probability that
justice will be done, that the facts found will be ‘true’ and the law applied ‘correct.’”).
278 See id. at 448–52.
279 See, e.g., Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 541 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“Because of these concerns for federal-state comity, Congress has strictly limited the procedures for federal habeas challenges to state convictions and state habeas decisions.”).
280 Perhaps the leading Supreme Court statement of comity’s meaning is in Hilton v.
Guyot, which defines comity as “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation.” 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
281 See Yackle, supra note 147, at 2345.
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far as the reasons for treating judgments as final do double duty as conditions
for recognizing and enforcing foreign convictions.
Even though its proponents invoke Professor Bator religiously, the
Appellate paradigm cannot be draped neatly atop the normative foundations
of the full-and-fair model. When the comity interest surfaces, it frequently
reflects an erroneous assumption that an F2 forum must give an F1 conviction as much preclusive effect as it would give a conviction from F2.282 Comity, however, is a principle that jurisdictions give some preclusive effect to
foreign judgments, not that foreign judgments are treated the same as
domestic ones.283 The comity interest embedded in full-and-fair models is
one that conditions preclusion on the reliability of process in the rendering
jurisdiction.284 Under the Appellate paradigm, however, preclusion is not
predicated on the F2 court’s confidence in the reliability of F1 process.
Professor Bator recognized the centrality of F1 procedure to comity and
finality interests, and so his argument about the equal treatment of state
criminal judgments is premised on the reliability of state process.285 Two
decades after AEDPA, it is difficult to fathom that Bator’s full-and-fair model
was considered too preclusive for the 103rd Congress286—an enacting legislature whose intent is now invoked in support of the most aggressive Appellateparadigm restrictions.287 AEDPA’s text categorically precludes relitigation if
a state merits disposition is not “based on” unreasonable factual determinations and does not “involve[ ] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.”288 The federal judiciary has constructed the statute to
impose not only the Relitigation model preclusion rule, but also the Appel282 For example, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court famously
held that Fourth Amendment challenges to state convictions were not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. See id. at 481–82. Stone distinguished Kaufman v. United States,
394 U.S. 217 (1969), a case holding that Fourth Amendment challenges to federal convictions were permitted. See id. at 486–87; see also, e.g., Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State
and Federal Court Authority to Grant Habeas Relief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 436 (2004)
(explaining that habeas jurisprudence is increasingly driven by comity and federalism
interests); cf. Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 461 (1980) (criticizing
the Supreme Court for reflexively equating the habeas consequences of a federal forfeiture
with that in a state criminal proceeding).
283 See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 9 (1991).
284 See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202–03 (providing the canonical statement that comity is
conditioned upon sufficiency of process producing the judgment in the F1 jurisdiction).
285 See Bator, supra note 8, at 451.
286 That § 2254(d) does not use the words “full and fair” actually reflects the failure of
restrictionist legislators to garner enough votes to obtain preferred Regard levels for state
convictions. See Kovarsky, supra note 184, at 464–65.
287 See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (“If this standard is difficult
to meet, that is because it was meant to be. As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short
of imposing a complete bar on federal-court relitigation of claims already rejected in state
proceedings.” (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996))); see also, e.g., Burt v.
Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786).
288 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2) (2012).
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late-model features of deference,289 outcome orientation,290 and intrinsicality.291 Outcome orientation and deference to flawed procedure would be
particularly problematic for Professor Bator and for the process-oriented
habeas models his work inspired.292 Under the Appellate paradigm, that a
state disposition be a product of reliable process is no longer a precondition
of F2 habeas preclusion.293 For that reason, comity and finality do not do
the same normative work for the Appellate paradigm that they did for the
full-and-fair model.
B.

The Day-in-Court Ideal

The Appellate paradigm also undermines the Anglo-American ideal that
all criminal defendants should have a “day in court.”294 There are various
phrasings of the ideal, and the defining judicial statement appears in a 1948
Supreme Court case, In re Oliver:295
We further hold that [the error] . . . was a denial of due process of law.
A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in
our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right
to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.296

There is obviously substantial slippage between the ideal and day-to-day
reality.297 Moreover, people disagree over the mix of values that the ideal
expresses,298 and they therefore prefer different compromises. The slippage
and the differentiated normative accounting are secondary to my larger
observation: by severing the relationship between the sufficiency of state process and the availability of a federal remedy, the Appellate paradigm chips
away at the ideal’s most basic features.
289 See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural
Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1001, 1026 (1986).
290 See id. at 1046; see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994) (discussing the canonical Supreme Court harmless error opinion in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23–24 (1967)).
291 See Merrill, supra note 190, at 940.
292 See Kovarsky, supra note 184, at 460–68 (collecting history of legislative proposals
modeled on the full-and-fair concept).
293 See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
294 Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 37–38
n.209 (1979) (emphasizing the role of ideal in criminal cases); Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the
Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236, 2256 (2013) (same).
295 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
296 Id. at 273 (footnote omitted).
297 For example, the pervasiveness of plea bargains underscores the idealized status of
day-in-court principles. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L. REV.
89, 156 (2012).
298 See infra notes 317–19 and accompanying text.
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Like other abstracted phenomena, the day-in-court ideal has a core.299
It might simply embody an aspiration to a judicial proceeding—any judicial
proceeding—as a condition of criminal punishment, but one can safely
exclude the possibility that those invoking the ideal have such kangaroocourt process in mind.300 The criminal-process ideal does capture a preference for individuated consideration and punishment.301 Collective-action
mechanisms are largely disabled in criminal cases,302 and each criminal
defendant is constitutionally entitled to at least an individualized determination of facts triggering a criminal punishment and (usually) a sentence.303
The elemental day-in-court feature, as Oliver describes, seems to be
“notice . . . and an opportunity to be heard” in a judicial proceeding.304
The day-in-court ideal has a slightly broader interpretation in the habeas
literature, where it sets norms for both trials and post-conviction proceedings.305 There are first-order due process rights that criminal defendants
enjoy during trial,306 but inmates may need to wait until post-conviction litigation to assert that any due process violation occurred.307 There frequently
exists a second-order question about how much post-conviction process a
state should provide to consider an allegation that there was trial-phase violation of a due process right. The most extreme versions of the day-in-court
ideal require the most post-conviction process. A defendant has no day in
court on the question of guilt, the argument goes, unless that defendant has
a day in court on the due process predicates for that guilt determination.308
Stated more colloquially, how effectively can institutions honor a day-in-court
ideal if inmates do not have procedural guarantees in the post-conviction
process for enforcing it?
That the ideal animates both trial and post-conviction process is particularly important when—as in the case with most habeas claims—the conduct
giving rise to the underlying violation also interferes with having the violation
considered at trial or on appeal. For example, when defense representation
299 See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 203, 209 (1996).
300 As the balance of this Section shows, any disagreement is over the content of a judicial proceeding and the normative justifications it is to reflect.
301 See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007).
302 See id. at 385–86.
303 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970).
304 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
305 See Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and
the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1877, 1888–1912 (2009).
306 See, e.g., supra notes 179–80.
307 See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (holding that, in criminal
cases, the final judgment rule “prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition
of sentence” (citing Berman v. United States, 302 U.S 211, 212 (1937))).
308 See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 12
(2006); Redish & Katt, supra note 305, at 1888.
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is prejudicially ineffective, it both violates Strickland v. Washington309 and
interferes with presentation of the claim on direct review.310 When the prosecution violates Brady v. Maryland311 by suppressing evidence, the violation
frequently remains undiscovered until long after direct-review proceedings
conclude; post-conviction process is the only forum to seek a remedy.312
That state inmates get a fair crack at litigating a claim before preclusion
attaches has animated habeas-reform proposals ranging from Batorian fulland-fair models,313 to that of a committee chaired by former Associate Justice
Lewis F. Powell.314 Brown v. Allen itself expresses the principle that every
inmate should have a federal forum to litigate a federal clam.315
The messy normative questions arise because the day-in-court ideal and
reality necessarily diverge. The scope of acceptable compromise depends on
one’s view of the ideal’s animating values. It has both dignitary and instrumental accounts. Dignitary justifications center on the intrinsic value of
party participation as a condition of coercive state action.316 Instrumental
justifications emphasize how the ideal secures other objectives. One instrumental account positions it as central to “truth discovery”—findings of historical fact, culpability determinations, and legal conclusions.317 Another
emphasizes its legitimacy-enforcing role.318 The day-in-court ideal, however,
is actually a bundle of rights reflecting all of these dignitary and instrumental
309 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
310 See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012).
311 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
312 See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1321–22 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Trevino v. Thaler, 133
S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013) (holding that Martinez applies where defendants lacked a “meaningful opportunity” to raise their claim on direct review, and should be permitted to raise
the claim via collateral review).
313 Batorian Relitigation models assume that a state inmate will have at least one procedurally sufficient shot, in state or federal court, at litigating a challenge. See Lee Kovarsky,
The Habeas Optimist, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 108, 114 (2014). The full-and-fair terminology echoes other preclusion rules based on the ideal. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson
Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (invoking the ideal as a limit to state estoppel rules); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (holding that binding parties not adequately represented in a prior piece of litigation ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause).
314 See JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL
CASES, COMMITTEE REPORT AND PROPOSAL (1989), reprinted in Report on Habeas Corpus in
Criminal Cases, 45 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3239, 3241–42 (1989).
315 See supra subsection II.B.1.
316 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364
(1978) (“[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication . . . [is] that it confers on the
affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision . . . . Whatever heightens the
significance of this participation lifts adjudication toward its optimum expression.
Whatever destroys the meaning of that participation destroys the integrity of adjudication
itself.”).
317 Cf. Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1369, 1396 n.138 (1991) (discussing the truth-seeking value of the ideal).
318 See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1327, 1335
(2009).
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values, but a particular legal right might implicate each stick in the bundle
differently.319 For example, rules against admitting self-incriminating statements or unlawfully obtained evidence might promote dignitary and legitimacy interests, but they might also undermine truth discovery. The most
corrosive deviations from the day-in-court ideal are those compromising the
most interests to the greatest degree.
Through intrinsicality, deference, and outcome orientation, the Appellate paradigm effectively permits flimsy state post-conviction process to launder trial-phase error. The day-in-court ideal dies by a million cuts: under
§ 2254(d), many claims subject to summary state post-conviction determination are now “reviewed” as though they received trial-like process;320 reliable
state process is no longer a condition for preclusion;321 lower federal courts
now determine whether a hypothetical rationale could reasonably support a
state outcome;322 the Court has defined an “unreasonable” state post-conviction result to mean an outcome with which no “fair-minded jurist” could
agree;323 and the § 2254(d) inquiry now ignores all evidence outside the
state post-conviction record.324 These federal restrictions encourage the most
troubling pathologies of state post-conviction adjudication: entry of state postconviction judgments with unreasoned opinions;325 in toto adoption of
unmodified state post-conviction findings submitted by the prosecution;326
and under-resourced state post-conviction representation.327 The Appellate
paradigm disguises the system’s most uncomfortable truth: there is frequently no procedurally reliable state disposition for federal courts to review.
C.

The Anti-Puppeteering Objection

I refer to the proposition that the federal Constitution guarantees federal habeas process to state inmates as the “constitutionality assumption.” If
the assumption holds, then Appellate-paradigm constructions of § 2254(d)
319 See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 200–02 (1983); Michel Rosenfeld, Can
Rights, Democracy, and Justice Be Reconciled Through Discourse Theory? Reflections on Habermas’s
Proceduralist Paradigm of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 791, 794 (1996); David L. Shapiro, Should
a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 45 (1984).
320 See supra note 224 and accompanying text (explaining the Supreme Court’s holding
in Harrington v. Richter).
321 See supra subsection III.C.1.
322 See supra notes 222–26 (documenting lower court rules).
323 See supra note 234 (detailing recent affirmation of rule).
324 See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text (describing post-AEDPA
intrinsicality).
325 See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
326 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Upton, 560 U.S. 284, 288 (2010) (per curiam) (noting the “verbatim” adoption of state-drafted findings (quoting Jefferson v. Zant, 431 S.E.2d 110, 111
(Ga. 1993))); Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (same).
327 Martinez v. Ryan only furnishes an ineffective state post-conviction attorney excuse
for default. See 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012). It does not provide a gateway around
§ 2254(d).
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violate constitutional “anti-puppeteering” principles associated with United
States v. Klein.328 Klein, which has come to stand for a body of good-government norms, is canonical (if difficult to penetrate) precedent about congressional power to use rules of jurisdiction and evidence to bypass constitutional
restrictions on its power to pass substantive law.329
I do not defend the constitutionality assumption here. Many contest it
capably,330 and there is no specific constitutional theory that commands consensus on the particulars.331 Professors James Liebman and William Ryan
have influentially theorized that a federal habeas guarantee for state inmates
is part of an Article III court’s mandate to ensure the supremacy of federal
law.332 Professor Jordan Steiker has argued that that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause entitles state inmates to a federal habeas forum.333
I have made an article-length case for it under the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities Clause.334 The Supreme Court itself has suggested
that a restriction might amount to an unconstitutional “suspension” if it lies
beyond the “compass” of the writ’s normal evolution.335 Under which theory
one makes the constitutionality assumption is secondary; puppeteering
328 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). Professor Gordon Young is the scholar to whom
most trace the reading of Klein as an anti-puppeteering case. See Gordon G. Young, A
Critical Reassessment of the Case Law Bearing on Congress’s Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the
Lower Federal Courts, 54 MD. L. REV. 132 (1995) [hereinafter Young, Critical Reassessment];
Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and Processes: United
States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1215–24 [hereinafter Young, Klein Revisited]; Gordon G. Young, United States v. Klein, Then and Now, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 265
(2012).
329 The Klein issues are presented as puppeteering concepts in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.
ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 303–05 (6th
ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER’S 6th]; see also, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 439–40 (2006)
(arguing that Klein bars use of procedure to “decepti[vely]” change statutory rules of decision); Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2529
(1998) (“[Klein’s first principle is that the] judiciary will not allow itself to be made to speak
and act against its own best judgment on matters within its competence which have great
consequence for our political community.”).
330 See, e.g., WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126–80
(1980) (assembling historical support for interpreting the Suspension Clause as a guarantee of state habeas process); Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts—Constitutional
Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REV. 335 (1952) (arguing that the Constitution guarantees no habeas process at all).
331 Cf. Hoffmann & King, supra note 219, at 839 (concluding that the Court will cobble
together a theory from Suspension Clause precedent to support the position).
332 See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 850–84 (1998).
333 See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 868 (1994).
334 See Kovarsky, supra note 30, at 612.
335 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996).
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problems arise in all scenarios where a state-inmate privilege is more than a
matter of legislative grace.
Section 2254(d) indirectly restricts what we casually call “substantive
rights,” but it directly restricts the constitutionally specified habeas remedy.336
That distinction is crucial. Some scholars have argued that § 2254(d) unacceptably interferes with Article III judicial power because it cabins the sourcing and method by which federal courts resolve underlying substantive
rights—i.e., federal “rules of decision.”337 Because § 2254(d) interferes with
how federal courts construct constitutionally specified substantive law, the
idea is that it violates Marbury’s bedrock principle that the Supreme Court is,
so to speak, the boss of what federal law means.338 Theories involving the
indirect effects on constitutionally specified substantive law assume an unnecessary argumentative burden. If the constitutionality assumption holds, then
§ 2254(d) is a direct restriction on a constitutionally specified procedural
remedy.
The extent to which Congress may use jurisdiction and procedure to
restrict a constitutionally specified remedy is a difficult question implicating
the jurisprudence and legal theory associated with Klein.339 As most “cult of
Klein” scholarship readily admits, any argument that there are constitutional
problems “under Klein” means problems under a set of anti-puppeteering
norms generally, but imperfectly, associated with the text of that decision.340
Chief Justice Chase’s opinion in Klein is among constitutional history’s most
enigmatic.341 If the constitutionality assumption holds, then—even under
narrow readings of Klein and the norms for which it now stands—Appellate
modeling of § 2254(d) is prohibited puppeteering.
1.

Klein and the Anti-Puppeteering Norm

In 1863 Civil War legislation,342 Congress authorized seizure and sale of
property taken in disloyal states, but permitted loyalist owners to recover sale
336 The Constitution specifies another remedy in the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
337 Rules of decision, generally speaking, regulate primary obligations and are considered “substantive law.” Alan M. Trammell, Jurisdictional Sequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 1099,
1103–04 (2013).
338 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Vicki C. Jackson,
Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts—Opposition,
Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2467 (1998) (discussing supportive
scholarship).
339 See supra note 328.
340 The “cult” meme expresses the idea that academic fascination with Klein reflects the
decision’s ambiguity. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN.
L. REV. 53, 55, 69 (2010) (citing Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 328, at 1195).
341 See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (questioning the
“precise scope of Klein”); HART AND WECHSLER’S 6th, supra note 329, at 303 (“Unfortunately, the Court’s opinion raises more questions than it answers.”); Sager, supra note 329,
at 2525 (calling Klein “deeply puzzling”).
342 See The Abandoned Property Collection Act, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820, 820 (1863).
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proceeds in suits against the Treasury. V.F. Wilson had been the surety on
bonds of Confederate officers, but President Lincoln pardoned him; his
estate (with Mr. Kline as the representative) sought proceeds for seized cotton.343 The Court of Claims held that Wilson was loyal.344 In United States v.
Padelford,345 decided while Klein was pending, the Supreme Court held that a
presidential pardon constructively established loyalty. Padelford was steeped
in constitutional avoidance, as the Court appeared to interpret the statute to
avoid impairing the President’s constitutionally specified pardon power.346
While Klein was still pending on appeal, Congress countermanded
Padelford in a piece of 1870 legislation.347 The 1870 Act disqualified pardons
as evidence of loyalty under the 1863 Act.348 In fact, courts were generally to
treat pardons as conclusive proof of disloyalty, and were to dismiss, for want of
jurisdiction, claims for proceeds by all pardoned disloyals.349 The 1870 legislation also contained several “procedural” provisions, sourced largely to congressional authority over Article III jurisdiction. The procedural provisions
were an odd raft of ducks. The 1870 Act stripped Supreme Court jurisdiction
to affirm Court of Claims awards in pending cases,350 required the Supreme
Court to dismiss appeals with instructions to the Court of Claims to dismiss
the cause from its docket,351 stripped federal jurisdiction to grant monetary
awards to disloyal claimants,352 and established an evidentiary presumption
that a presidential pardon was almost always conclusive proof of disloyalty.353
The legislation is not so confusing once one understands that it was not “procedural” at all; these were provisions designed to thwart judicial enforcement
of the pardon power.
Klein struck down the restrictions in the 1870 Act.354 Klein’s constitutional holding is maximally disorienting if presented as a doctrinal rule about
which specific statutory provisions violated what specific strings of constitutional text. The constitutional problem was that, collectively, the provisions
abusively invoked congressional power to regulate the judiciary; they were
pretext to effectuate otherwise verboten limits on the pardon power.355
Abstractly, the Court found constitutionally problematic the related ideas
that the 1870 Act “shows plainly that it does not intend to withhold appellate
343 Kline v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 559, 566–67 (1868), modified sub nom. Klein v. United
States, 7 Ct. Cl. vii (1871), aff’d, United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128 (1871).
344 Id. at 567.
345 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
346 See id. at 542–43.
347 See Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230.
348 See id. at 235.
349 See id.
350 See id.
351 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145–46 (1871).
352 16 Stat. at 235.
353 See id.
354 See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146–48.
355 See generally Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128. Klein itself does not articulate this logical
proposition effectively.
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jurisdiction except as a means to an end” and that “denial of jurisdiction to
this court, as well as to the Court of Claims, is founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress.”356
The Court also condemned the constructive-disloyalty provision as a violation
of the pardon power masquerading as an evidence rule.357 Some analyze
Klein as a more limited Exceptions Clause holding,358 but those accounts
unreasonably discount opinion language expressing the broader anti-puppeteering principles.359 In Klein, three things combined to work as a synthetic rule of decision about pardons: the restrictions on the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the restrictions on the lower federal courts’
original jurisdiction, and the evidentiary presumption. That synthesis was
constitutionally impermissible because it was mimicking an actual rule of
decision about pardons that Congress could not pass.360
As the cult of Klein phrasing suggests, a small but intensely focused
group of academics have argued vigorously over the meaning of Chief Justice
Chase’s opinion, and over how to synthesize it with sparse precedent that
followed.361 Klein scholars generally associate Klein with several other antipuppeteering cases that involve similar questions: those in which trial courts
could not enforce the 1870 Act’s rule that they must dismiss actions for proceeds by pardoned claimants,362 and those in which the Court considered
whether Congress can create federal jurisdiction to prosecute a crime but
withhold jurisdiction to consider a constitutional defense.363 Others have
flagged Klein’s extraordinary real-world importance for proposals dealing
with school busing, reproductive rights, school prayer, and national-security
detention.364 If the constitutionality assumption obtains, then the Appellateparadigm construction of § 2254(d) violates anti-puppeteering norms even
more flagrantly than did the legislative proposals touching on those other
issues.

356 See id. at 145–46.
357 See id. at 147–48.
358 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Amending the Exceptions Clause, 92 MINN. L. REV. 971, 1014
(2008) (“At least implicitly, then, Klein’s holding endorsed a separation of powers limitation on the Exceptions Clause.”); Louis J. Virelli III, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme
Court Recusal, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535, 1583 (2012) (describing Klein as “the lone case
in which the Court did strike a statute under the Exceptions Clause”).
359 Klein itself notes this distinction. See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145–46.
360 See id. at 146–47 (distinguishing permissible puppeteering provision in Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855)).
361 See supra notes 340–41, 358.
362 See Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1871); Witkowski v. United
States, 7 Ct. Cl. 393 (1871).
363 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 468 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
364 See Howard M. Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, the War on Terror, and United
States v. Klein, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 211 (2011) (national security); Young, Klein
Revisited, supra note 328, at 1190–91 (busing, reproductive rights, and school prayer).
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Section 2254(d) as Impermissible Puppeteering

I operate with the following anti-puppeteering norm: Congress cannot
invoke its Article I power to constitute Article III courts in an effort to mimic
a substantive rule of decision that it could not otherwise enact.365 So, for
example, Congress could not pass a statute stating that proof of English citizenship conclusively established, as a matter of evidence, that someone was
not a “person” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. In that scenario, Congress could not work around rules forbidding certain forms of alienage discrimination under the auspices of establishing evidence rules
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.366 Certain Appellate-model constructions of § 2254(d) belong in the same category of forbidden statutory law. In
light of the anti-puppeteering rule and the constitutionality assumption,
when do procedural restrictions on a state-inmate privilege cross a line?
Among the courts and academics that have considered the issue, the
relationship between Klein and the privilege is treated as a question about
the degree to which Congress could use habeas as a means of puppeteering
judicial dispositions on some other substantive rule of decision.367 Congressional interference with habeas process is, in this sense, like any other congressional restriction on judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights. Under
the constitutionality assumption, that analogy sells the habeas power short.
Rather than evaluating the degree to which habeas restrictions may interfere
with some other substantive rule of decision, legal institutions should be evaluating the degree to which such restrictions may directly interfere with a
remedy that is itself constitutionally specified.
The essential quality of the habeas privilege is its guarantee of a federal
forum to determine the lawfulness of custody.368 If anti-puppeteering principles preclude Congress from using second-order procedural rules to interfere with constitutionally specified first-order powers,369 then Congress is
presumably forbidden from using second-order rules to interfere with constitutionally specified first-order remedies. The distinction between Relitigation and Appellate paradigms is central to my normative position because it
365 I separate my Klein principle from the more aggressive readings of Klein detailed at
the end of this subsection. Additionally, I would not designate the 1870 Act’s Supreme
Court provisions as “puppeteering” and the Act’s lower court provisions as jurisdiction
stripping. Cf. Young, Critical Reassessment, supra note 328, at 158–59 (drawing such a distinction). The 1870 Act’s lower court provisions were one part of a puppeteering statute,
and the anti-puppeteering principle limits congressional regulation of lower court jurisdiction. See HART AND WECHSLER’S 6th, supra note 329, at 304–05 n.27 (suggesting that Professor Young’s earlier work might have overstated the difference between the two types of
limits).
366 See Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064.
367 See Jackson, supra note 338, at 2467 (collecting authority).
368 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008).
369 In the military-detention context, the Supreme Court squarely held that habeas process has essentialized features walled off from congressional incursion. See id. at 771.
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capably tracks the distinction between permissible procedural restrictions on
and impermissible puppeteering of the privilege.
Traditional procedural restrictions involving things like timeliness and
frivolity are inevitable features of any congressional regulation.370 The Lawof-Judgments literature does not categorically treat all facets of preclusion
rules as procedural;371 inter-jurisdictional preclusion promotes some F1
interests that might be considered substantive. The modern habeas Regard
Scenario, however, does not implicate any major source of F1 state substantive interest: interests in avoiding double monetary recovery, in defining the
scope of the claim, and in specifying who is bound.372 A process-oriented F2
preclusion rule simply acts like any other procedural limit that does not
reduce to a merits assessment of the claim. When § 2254(d) operates like a
preclusion rule in which the sufficiency of F1 process is determined by F2, it
does not interfere with the basic features of habeas power. As explained in
Part III, however, legal institutions do not apply § 2254(d) that way. Instead,
they have constructed § 2254(d) nontraditionally, incorporating Appellateparadigm features—intrinsicality, deference, and outcome orientation—that
transform it into an impermissible puppeteering provision.
Outcome orientation presents a particularly vexing anti-puppeteering
problem for restrictions on habeas power. To the extent that preclusion
rules are procedural, it is precisely because they lack outcome orientation
and are focused on the sufficiency of prior process.373 An F1 judgment
might be preclusive because the F2 jurisdiction decides that the F1 process
was sufficiently adapted to determining the Truth,374 not because the outcome was close enough to the Truth to trigger preclusion notwithstanding
procedural infirmity.375 The Relitigation paradigm always honored that distinction. Because the Appellate paradigm smuggles an outcome orientation
into the Step 1 preclusion inquiry, it transforms § 2254(d) from a procedural
limitation on the privilege into a disfavored form of substantive puppeteering. The Appellate paradigm does not limit habeas relief by defining a procedural relitigation restriction, but by redefining what types of unlawful
custody get a habeas remedy.
370 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2012) (limitations statute); Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 4 (2004) (frivolity rule).
371 See Erichson, supra note 40, at 1017, 961–63.
372 See Burbank, supra note 7, at 1054–55; D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure” Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions”, 30 UCLA L. REV. 189, 210 (1982); Gene R. Shreve, Preclusion and Federal Choice of
Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1260 (1986).
373 See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
374 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Preclusion as to Issues of Law: The Legal System’s Interest, 70
IOWA L. REV. 81, 88 (1984).
375 But cf. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970) (proposing that habeas law be reorganized to preclude
based on evidence of innocence).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL203.txt

688

unknown

Seq: 52

notre dame law review

19-JAN-17

9:33

[vol. 92:2

In combination, Appellate-paradigm deference and intrinsicality also
present serious puppeteering problems.376 Their combined operation
makes § 2254(d) difficult to distinguish meaningfully from the evidentiary
“presumption” and limits on lower court jurisdiction at issue in Klein itself.
In Klein, Congress had tried an end-around the pardon power by legislating a
virtually conclusive presumption about the relationship between pardons and
loyalty,377 which a pardonee could overcome only by reference to recitations
in the underlying pardon document.378 Section 2254(d), as constructed
under the Appellate paradigm, amounts to the same trick. It relies on deference and intrinsicality to impose a similar presumption around a state merits
determination, thereby skirting the constitutionally specified habeas power
to determine lawfulness and order discharge by reference to the sufficiency
of F1 process.
Intrinsicality and deference would pose a lesser puppeteering problem if
they operated at different parts of the habeas process, as they do under the
Relitigation paradigm and under inter-jurisdictional preclusion inquiry
involving civil judgments. Before AEDPA’s § 2254(d) alterations, there was
no deference on legal questions, and deference on fact questions materialized only after a (Step 1) determination that state process was reliable.379
After AEDPA, however, deference attaches in the process of applying Step 1. A
state decision is not unreasonable—and a state inmate cannot obtain a (Step
2) merits determination—unless “no fair-minded jurist” (deference) would
think that the state record (intrinsicality) supported the state result (outcome orientation).380
Worth mentioning is that problems I identify with Appellate-paradigm
construction of the § 2254(d) position are not contingent upon an aggressive
anti-puppeteering norm. For example, I do not read Klein as a restriction on
congressional authority to strip the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in
pending cases.381 Nor do I subscribe to an interpretation of Klein as a restriction on the congressional power to adjust the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in
all cases.382 Finally, I need not commit to any proposition about how antipuppeteering principles would affect statutorily specified rules of decision.383
I find anti-puppeteering constraints on statutory rights desirable as a goodgovernance principle, but the legal authority for my position is far stronger.
By relying on outcome orientation and by combining intrinsicality and defer376 On its own, intrinsicality does not present constitutional problems that are unique
to the appellate paradigm.
377 See Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
378 See id.
379 See supra subsections II.B.1 (merits decisions), II.B.3 (factual predicates).
380 See supra subsections III.C.1 (merits decisions), III.C.3 (factual predicates).
381 See supra notes 357–58 and accompanying text.
382 See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
383 For one such discussion of the limits of Congress’s power to manipulate the judicial
process, see generally Redish & Pudelski, supra note 329, at 437.
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ence into a single step, legal institutions are constructing § 2254(d) as a puppeteering rule that impermissibly interferes with the privilege.
CONCLUSION
The proposition that state criminal convictions are less preclusive than
are judgments rendered in civil actions is an article of faith among those who
favor new limits on habeas relief, and it is a deeply embedded assumption
even among those who do not. It is also incorrect. Controlling for the presence of jurisdiction and a cause of action—thereby isolating the real habeas
prelusion rules—reveals that state convictions are, in fact, idiosyncratically
preclusive. This Article therefore amounts to an attack on the central narrative accompanying modern habeas restrictions, which positions them as necessary to conform habeas law to standard relitigation norms.
With respect to the Appellate paradigm—the vehicle for transforming
the norms of habeas relitigation—I hope I leave readers with a vantage of
both trees and forest. As for the trees, the Appellate paradigm poses immediate challenges for courts and scholars seeking to justify modern decisions by
reference to foundational text and habeas theory. As for the forest, Article
III judges have been neither neutral interpreters of legal authority nor the
faithful stewards of some inherited habeas paradigm. Instead, they have
been creative lawmaking agents, developing habeas process that selectively
borrows limiting principles from appellate models of direct review in criminal cases.
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